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Я к вам пишу – чего же боле? 
Что я могу еще сказать? 
А.С. Пушкин 
“I write to you – what more can I do?  
What else can I say?” 
From Evgeny Onegin by Alexsandr Pushkin 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ussia is now once again one of the ten largest economies in the 
world (representing around 80% of Germany’s GDP in purchasing 
power parity in 2007). Additionally, Russia is the third largest trade 
partner of the EU, the fourth largest trade partner of the eurozone and an 
essential energy supplier to the EU. This recovery makes Russia an 
economic – and political – actor that cannot be ignored, and arguably also a 
different country.1 
This book describes the country’s evolving policy framework and 
macroeconomic performance, from the difficult days of the 'transition 
recession' and the 1998 crisis to the sustained and robust growth since 1999, 
which is only partially related to the energy price cycle. It considers several 
different components of the improved Russian macro and microeconomic 
frameworks. The study also looks at some of the remaining reform 
priorities and provides policy recommendations. 
Chapter 1 of this book describes the substantial changes observed in 
Russia since the end of the USSR. It charts the initial period of economic 
and social dislocation following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
introduction of market economy institutions, to the apparent stabilisation 
of the mid-1990s and the subsequent crisis of 1998. It also traces the 
                                                 
1 This description (and the title of this book) is of course a play on the words 
contained in the titles of the papers by Shleifer & Treisman (2005), “A Normal 
Country: Russia after Communism” and Rosefielde (2005), “Russia: An Abnormal 
Country”, which engage in that traditional Western discussion of how ‘normal’ 
Russia is. 
R 
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resumption of growth from 1999 onwards, generated by the accumulated 
effects of economic and structural reforms and high energy prices. Chapter 
1 also shows that Russia's macroeconomic performance has actually not 
been any less than that of truly similar countries, either before or after 1998. 
The length and intensity of its transitional recession were related to the 
later start of reforms in the CIS countries, the depth of distortions 
accumulated by three generations of a centrally planned economy and the 
lack of a truly binding external anchor. The situation was further 
aggravated by the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
Chapter 2 looks at some of the remaining reform challenges for the 
fiscal and monetary systems, foreign direct investment, competitiveness, 
the energy sector, social development and state reform. It also argues that 
in terms of structural reform, when benchmarked against broadly similar 
economies – either other CIS countries or the other emerging giants of the 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) – Russia's performance is 
impressive. All the fundamental structures of a market economy have been 
established and the macroeconomic framework is much more robust than it 
was in the mid-1990s. Additionally, despite the perception conveyed by 
some analyses, structural reform – albeit slower in certain areas – has not 
stopped. That is not to say that a substantial, unfinished reform agenda 
does not remain: it does, and it includes some macro components, but 
mostly microeconomic and structural ones. Chapter 2 therefore also looks 
at this unfinished reform agenda. In terms of the macro challenges, how to 
cope with the reduction and eventual disappearance of the current account 
surplus is likely to be the most important matter for medium-term policy. 
This change will imply a need for continued positive net capital inflows, 
and the related need for a reliable investment climate, which is linked to 
the reform of the Russian state institutions and policies. Continued support 
for the reform of the wider apparatus of the Russian state and for the 
international fora that enable the sharing of international best practice with 
the Russian government are a part of this. The full use of external anchors 
for reform (the G8, WTO accession, OECD membership plus the extensive 
network of agreements and fora between the EU and Russia – the future 
EU–Russia framework agreement and eventual EU–Russia deep free trade 
agreement and the EU–Russia Sectoral Dialogues) is a feasible, necessary 
and important part of this strategy. 
Chapter 3 concludes the book with a summary of the previous 
chapters and their recommendations. 
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1. RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: 
THE 1991-2008 ‘TRANSITIONS’ 
his chapter presents the reform process in Russia during the 1990s, 
from Gorbachev to Yeltsin. It also discusses the associated 
macroeconomic performance of the ‘newly independent’ Russia, 
from the early 1990s until the latter part of the 2000s. 
1.1 Economic reform2 in Russia during the early 1990s 
1.1.1 Gorbachev and incidental reforms 
Formally, the end of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR or Soviet 
Union) took place in early December 1991, but actually, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and of the associated planned economic system did not occur 
at a single moment in time. Effectively, it had already begun with the 
economic slowdown (Ofer, 1987) observed during the long Brezhnev 
government (1964–82), and it was arguably accelerated by the partial 
economic liberalisation reforms undertaken during the Gorbachev 
government (1985–91).  
                                                 
2 A transition process from central planning to a market-based economy has to 
fulfil two fundamental and interdependent goals, macroeconomic stabilisation and 
microeconomic/structural reform (see Vinhas de Souza, 2003), which must occur 
in parallel with the integration of an autarky into the rest of the world economy. 
The former entails implementing consistent, stability-oriented fiscal and monetary 
policies, while the latter requires establishing all the frameworks (legal and 
institutional) necessary for a market economy to operate efficiently (including the 
legalisation of private property and price liberalisation). 
T 
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Economic reform had also started before the 1991 break-up of the 
Soviet Union,3 and the path and limits of this economic reform process in 
the country cannot be understood separately from the political constraints 
faced by the Soviet/Russian leadership. The partial economic liberalisation 
under President Mikhail Gorbachev4 (the six years of the so-called 
‘perestroika’5 period) ultimately failed, but brought a foretaste of things to 
come (Mau & Starodubrovskaya, 2001). Central planning was restricted6 
and later limited incentives for the development of private enterprises were 
introduced through the legalisation of small cooperatives, joint ventures 
with state enterprises and local councils, and self-employment.7  
                                                 
3 The official end of the Soviet Union happened on 8 December 1991, when Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin met with the Presidents of Ukraine and Belarus, Leonid 
Kravchuk and Stanislau Shushkevich, at the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Natural 
Reserve in Belarus. There the three presidents announced the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the establishment of a (voluntary) Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in its place. Mr Yeltsin’s decision to call this meeting was 
kept secret from the incumbent Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. 
4 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was born in 1931 in the village of Privolnoya in 
the Caucasus. He ascended from Regional Party Leader to the Politburo within the 
Communist Party under the protection of Yuri Andropov, the (reformist) KGB 
head who was briefly Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (i.e. president of the USSR) for 15 months between 1982 and 1984. 
5 Perestroika means restructuring. This economic reform component was supposed 
to be developed in tandem with another component involving political reform, 
more specifically ‘glasnost’ [openness]. 
6 The restriction was affected through the June 1987 Law of State Enterprise. With 
this law, central planning was replaced by a ‘state orders system’, covering some of 
the manufacturing industries and enabling them to sell a share of their production 
in the ‘free market’. This law also allowed the closure of loss-making enterprises. 
In practical terms, this reform had limited effectiveness, as the pricing and supply 
structures that enterprises dealt with remained unchanged. 
7 The legalisation occurred through the May 1988 Law on Cooperatives. Many of 
the companies formed under this law engaged in exports, as they were able to 
access commodities at controlled prices and sell them at world market prices with 
significant profits. The 1989 Law on Leasing also enabled employees to lease state 
enterprises with a right to a subsequent full buy-out. These laws are the true origin 
of the Russian oligarch class that was to reach its maturity with the privatisation 
programme of the 1990s. 
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These were important but piecemeal reforms. Moreover, a supporting 
policy mix was absent: fiscal and monetary latitude contributed to an 
increase of the pre-existing monetary overhang.8 Meanwhile, the external 
position of the Soviet Union had become relatively vulnerable in the late 
1980s, owing to cyclically low oil prices (which led to the accumulation of 
external debt, partially to support a surge in the imports of consumer 
goods). 
The explanation for this limited and inconsistent set of reforms lies in 
the diminishing support President Gorbachev encountered within the 
dominant political force in the USSR at the time, the bureaucratic and state 
apparatus of the Communist Party (Neville, 2003). Furthermore, this was 
not the first time that a partial reform of the centrally planned economy 
had failed in the Soviet Union: previous attempts include the 1921–29 New 
Economic Policy and the 1965–68 abortive reform of the incentives system 
(Mau & Starodubrovskaya, 2001). 
Of course, one of the main goals of perestroika (and glasnost) was the 
weakening of the Communist Party itself, but another contradiction within 
the reform process constrained the achievement of this goal – Mr 
Gorbachev’s own personal loyalties. He seemingly never intended fully to 
replace either the centrally planned economy or the Soviet Union (Mau & 
Starodubrovskaya, 2001; Kotz & Weir, 2007). This ambiguity on the part of 
the leader of the initial reform process also substantially explains its 
ultimate failure. 
The perestroika inconsistencies were only overcome by the 
appearance of a new political force, in the form of Boris Yeltsin, the first 
President of the newly ‘independent’ Russian Federation.9 
                                                 
8 Traditionally, in centrally planned economies, markets fail to clear, i.e. supply and 
demand do not balance. In a market economy, the adjustment would be through 
prices in such a situation. As prices were controlled in the Soviet economies, unused 
monetary balances that could not be converted to goods or services – as these were 
not available – would be accumulated by households and firms. The liberalisation 
of prices and external trade, besides the macro balance and allocative micro-
efficiency issues involved, aimed to eliminate some of this surplus. 
9 Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was born in 1931 in the Sverdlovsk oblast. A popular 
‘mayor’ of Moscow (formally the First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union) from 1985–87, he was relieved from this 
post by Mikhail Gorbachev. After two years in the political wilderness, Mr Yeltsin 
was elected to the Supreme Soviet in March 1989, and in May 1990, he was elected 
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1.1.2 The Yeltsin economic reform programme 
In October 1991, two months before the official end of the Soviet Union and 
two months after a failed conservative coup against the Gorbachev regime, 
Boris Yeltsin and his team of economic advisers, led by the liberal Yegor 
Gaidar (who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Economy and Finance) designed a programme of comprehensive economic 
reforms. The presidential team was granted special powers by the Supreme 
Soviet (still the upper legislative chamber) to implement these reforms.10 
This (first) Yeltsin reform programme laid out a number of policy 
measures to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation (Mau & 
Starodubrovskaya, 2001; Neville, 2003). These included a planned sharp 
reduction in government spending (targeting mainly investment, defence 
and subsidies) to progressively reduce the government budget deficit from 
its very high 1991 level. The government launched new taxes and the tax 
collection system was to be overhauled to increase fiscal revenues. The 
programme also required the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to cut 
subsidised credits to enterprises and to restrict money supply growth. A 
progressive reduction of inflation was projected, from the double-digit 
monthly levels observed in 1991. Additionally, the programme proposed the 
rapid creation of a de novo private sector, through a privatisation initiative11 
whose ultimate goal was to develop a new entrepreneurial, property-
owning social class that would support the reform process (for a 
description of the Russian privatisation programme, see Box 1.1). In early 
1992, the government lifted price controls on most consumer and 
intermediate goods.12 It increased – but still controlled – prices on energy 
and food staples, e.g. bread, sugar and dairy products.  
                                                                                                                            
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR). On 12 June 1991, he won the first direct presidential 
elections for the Russian Federation, taking office on 10 July 1991. He died on 23 
April 2007, while this book was being written. 
10 The Yeltsin reform programme was complicated by the significant devolution of 
political and economic authority from the federal to the regional level, in a series of 
ad hoc agreements with Russia’s many republics and other subnational authorities. 
11 Privatisation was allowed by the December 1991 Presidential Decree on 
Accelerating the Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises. The 
Supreme Soviet of Russia endorsed the Law of Privatisation in June 1992, which 
covered both medium-sized and large state-owned enterprises. 
12 Via the Presidential Decree on Lifting Price Controls of 12 January 1992.  
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Box 1.1 The Russian privatisation programme 
The Russian privatisation programme was planned by Anatoly Borisovich 
Chubays, first Chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State 
Property during the first Yeltsin presidency (and current Chairman of the 
former electricity monopoly, RAO-UES). Its initial step was a voucher 
privatisation scheme, pushed by the Supreme Soviet against the wishes of Mr 
Chubays and Yegor Gaidar, who had wanted a direct sales privatisation from 
early on (Mau & Starodubrovskaya, 2001). 
On 1 October 1992, vouchers, each with a nominal value of RUB 10,000 (or 
about $63), were distributed to the (then) 148 million citizens of the Russian 
Federation for the purchase of shares in medium-sized and large enterprises 
slated for privatisation. (Small enterprises were sold directly to interested 
investors; among other companies, banks were excluded from this privatisation 
process.) Voucher-holders could also sell the vouchers or invest in ‘voucher 
funds’. Overnight this increased the private sector share in GDP by a factor of 5 
(see Table B1.1). 
At the end of June 1994, the voucher privatisation programme was 
completed. It succeeded in transferring ownership of 70% of Russia’s large and 
medium-sized enterprises and in privatising about 90% of small enterprises, 
mostly to managers (and former workers) of those companies (which is usually 
referred to as an ‘insiders’ privatisation). By that time, 96% of the vouchers 
issued in 1992 had been used by their owners to buy shares in firms directly, 
invest in voucher funds or sell them on the secondary stock markets. 
The next phase of the privatisation programme called for direct sales of the 
remaining state-owned enterprises, bringing in a much larger component of 
external control to the privatisation process, as ‘red directors’ were replaced by 
oligarchs. Since this met considerable opposition in the State Duma, President 
Yeltsin implemented it by a government decree on 1 July 1994. This second 
phase of the privatisation programme was completed by the first quarter of 
1996. It significantly increased privatisation revenues (Table B1.1), but it has 
since been dogged by legal challenges. By February 1996, an investigation had 
already been launched into a 1995 transaction in which banks had awarded 
loans to the government in return for ‘privatisation’ shares in those enterprises 
(among the main beneficiaries were Menatep Bank, the financial arm of the 
group that will later become Yukos, and Oneximbank – see Appel, 1997). These 
loans-for-shares transactions were undertaken against the backdrop of an urgent 
need for budgetary revenue by the Russian government, but they also enabled 
truly phenomenal profits for a very limited number of individuals. 
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Fundamental changes were made in the tax system. A value added 
tax was introduced on most transactions, and both a progressive income 
tax and a tax on enterprise revenues were established. The whole system of 
import and export tariffs was revised. New (higher) domestic energy prices 
were charged and new taxes on oil and natural gas exports were levied, 
seeking to narrow the gap between the (still subsidised to this day) 
domestic prices and world prices and to prevent domestic energy 
shortages. Most restrictions on foreign trade and investment were lifted 
(Kotz & Weir, 2007).13 
                                                 
13 The elimination of the state monopoly over foreign trade was proclaimed by the 
Presidential Decree on Liberalisation of Foreign Economic Activity on the Territory 
of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic on 15 November 1991. Quotas on 
energy and raw material exports were kept. Although imports were liberalised, 
import duties were not initially established, as no such duties existed in the USSR. 
Box 1.1, cont. 
The privatisation programme was halted from late 1995 to July 1996 during 
President Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign (assisted by the financial 
support of the oligarch class he had helped to create). From June 1996 onwards, 
the privatisation programme resumed, this time based on lists of specific, large 
state-owned enterprises to be sold through initial public offerings (IPOs). This 
action was enshrined in the July 1997 Law on the Privatisation of State-Owned 
Property and the Guidelines for Privatising Municipal Property in the Russian 
Federation. The heroic phase of the Russian (re)privatisation programme had 
already ended: in the space of only five years, the share of Russian GDP 
produced by the private sector had risen from close to 0 to around 70% (Table 
B1.1). 
Table B1.1 Privatisation revenues in Russia and the share of the private sector  
in GDP ($ billion) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Privatisation revenues  35 88 110 – 1,002 1,192 4,177 909 
% of Russia in total 
privatisation 
revenues in Central 
and Eastern Europe 
and the CIS 
1.37 2.43 2.76 0 10.3 21.8 25.3 11.4 
Share of private sector 
  in GDP (%) 
5 25 40 50 55 60 70 70 
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and World Bank (2000). 
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1.1.3 A timeline of reform policies 
Monetary policy in this newly created Russia was initially very 
accommodative. In January 1992, the government limited the growth of 
money supply14 at the same time that most price controls were lifted.  
Already by February 1992,15 however, the CBR had resumed 
monetary expansion; by the end of 1992, the total Russian money supply 
had grown by around 18 times in nominal terms. 
This very sharp increase in money supply was a reaction to the 
(necessary) post-liberalisation price adjustment, but it was also because of 
the absence of hard budget constraints in the still large state-owned sector. 
Banks (mostly state-owned) monetised interenterprise debts through their 
accounts and through their privileged access to the CBR (Owen & 
Robinson, 2003). Domestic credit aggregates reportedly grew by a factor of 
9 between 1991 and 1992. This credit expansion was partially related to the 
CBR monetisation of interenterprise arrears: the government had limited 
the direct fiscal financing of state enterprises after January 1992, but they 
had reacted by building up arrears and interenterprise loans. By mid-1992, 
unpaid interenterprise loans had reached RUB 3.2 trillion (about $20 
billion); the government later provided credit relief to those enterprises. 
The government itself also failed to constrain its own expenditures, 
partially owing to the remaining influence of the Russian Supreme Soviet 
(which was violently dissolved in September 1993 and replaced by the new 
State Duma16 in December of that year). At the end of 1992, the Russian 
budget deficit was close to 20% of GDP, or four times the projected share 
under the economic programme. This budget deficit was largely financed 
by monetary expansion, resulting in an inflation rate of over 2,500% in 
                                                 
14 The CBR was then under the direct political control of the conservative Supreme 
Council of the Russian Federation (the parliament) and its Chairman, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov. Mr Khasbulatov was engaged in a political conflict with the reformist 
administration of President Yeltsin and he used the CBR as an instrument against 
the government’s reforms and stabilisation policies. 
15 By that time, the IMF was advising the government and the CBR on preparing a 
joint policy programme (even before Russia’s formal IMF membership, which 
occurred on 1 June 1992). This programme, however, did not include money 
growth targets, owing to the CBR’s resistance. 
16 The Duma is the directly elected lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly, 
with the upper house being the Federation Council (which is made up of two 
members appointed by each region). 
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1992. These failures and the continuing conflict with the parliament led to 
the dismissal of the Gaidar cabinet and his replacement by the less 
reformist Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, an avuncular former head of 
the Ministry of the Gas Industry (MinGazProm, which would later become 
the notorious Gazprom company) and currently the Russian Ambassador 
in Ukraine.17 
Nevertheless, Chernomyrdin appointed Boris Fedorov, perceived as a 
reformer, as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister. In January 1993, 
Mr Fedorov announced plans for an ‘anti-crisis programme’ seeking to 
control inflation through tighter and consistent monetary and fiscal 
policies. Under the programme, the government would limit the budgetary 
financing of the deficit and close or privatise inefficient state-owned 
enterprises. Furthermore, the programme required the CBR to increase 
interest rates and reduce monetary financing. In May 1993, the Ministry of 
Finance and the CBR formally agreed to this stabilisation package. A new 
federal Constitution was approved by a referendum in December 1993, 
which strengthened the position of the presidency in its dealings with the 
State Duma (Kotz & Weir, 2007). 
The 1993 stabilisation package had some early successes. In the first 
three quarters of 1993, the CBR reduced both money and credit creation.18 
As a result, the 1993 annual inflation rate fell to around 900% – still very 
high but a considerable improvement over 1992. Based on these early 
positive results, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) paid a first tranche 
of $1.5 billion to Russia from an agreed Systemic Transformation Facility in 
July 1993 (see Table 1.1), easing Russia’s external position.19 
                                                 
17 Yegor Timurovich Gaidar remained in the government until December 1992, and 
then returned from September 1993 until January 1994 as First Deputy Prime 
Minister. The son and grandson of high Soviet nomenklatura (his father was a rear 
admiral, his grandfather a famous Bolshevik writer), after leaving government 
Yegor Gaidar founded a reformist political party (the Union of Right Forces) and 
was elected as a deputy in the State Duma between 1999 and 2003. After leaving 
the Duma, he concentrated on his academic activities (he is currently President of 
an economic think tank, the Institute for the Economy in Transition).  
18 Some of this improvement was brought about by a further build-up of 
interenterprise arrears in 1993. 
19 The Systemic Transformation Facility was created in April 1993, to enable the 
IMF to lend to countries in transition from centrally planned to market economies 
before  they started implementing macro stabilisation and structural reforms. 
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Table 1.1 IMF lending to Russia, by type of arrangement and value (in $ million) 
Type of arrangement 
 
IMF Board 
approval date
Amount 
approved
Amount 
disbursed
Stand-by Arrangement (1st tranche) 05/08/1992 1,047.2 1,047.2
Systemic Transformation Facility 
(1st  tranche) 
30/06/1993 1,513.1 1,513.1
Systemic Transformation Facility 
(2nd tranche) 
22/03/1994 1,522.8 1,522.8
Stand-by Arrangement (1st tranche) 11/04/1995 6,798.2 6,798.2
Extended Fund Facility 26/03/1996 10,083.8 7,459.5
Extended Fund Facility Augmentation 20/07/1998 1,659.2 –
Supplemental Reserve Facility 20/07/1998 5,307.3 897.4
Compensation and Contingent  
Financing Facility 
20/07/1998 2,867.7 2,867.7
Stand-by Arrangement 28/07/1999 4,501.9 642.5
Total – 35,301.1 22,748.3
Source: IMF. 
 
In mid-1994, the Chernomyrdin government presented an additional 
reform package to parliament, which was again undermined by the CBR 
and by pressure groups lobbying the State Duma for subsides. This 
outcome led to further inflationary pressures and a run on the ruble during 
October 1994 – on a single day, 11 October 1994 (dubbed ‘Black Tuesday’), 
the ruble dropped by 27%.  
President Yeltsin reacted to this by firing Viktor Vladimirovich 
Gerashchenko,20 who had been head of the CBR since the late 1980s (when 
the CBR had still been the state bank of the Soviet Union, Gosbank) and 
nominating Tatiana Paramonova as his replacement. She implemented 
tighter monetary and credit policies, and introduced a harder exchange rate 
regime (see section 1.4.3). This was supported by a 1995 parliamentary act 
that restricted the monetary financing of the budget, while the Ministry of 
Finance began to issue government bonds to finance the deficit. The 1995 
budget draft – presented to the Duma in September 1994 – included a 
further commitment to curtail ‘soft budget constraints’ in state-owned 
                                                 
20 At that time, infamously described as the “worst Central Banker in history” by 
Harvard’s Jeffrey Sachs, who was an adviser to the Russian government between 
November 1991 and January 1994. 
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enterprises. Another IMF programme supporting the new reform package 
was negotiated in April 1995, to shore up the external position of Russia 
(Table 1.1). 
Nevertheless, the electoral cycle (parliamentary elections were 
scheduled for December 1995, and presidential elections for mid-1996) 
caused fiscal easing pressures to reappear in late 1995. This situation led to 
the replacement of some of the remaining key reformists in the Yeltsin 
economic team (Tatiana Paramonova,21 who was replaced in November 
1995 by Sergey Dubinin, while Anatoly Chubays left his position as First 
Deputy Prime Minister in January 1996). President Yeltsin was re-elected in 
the second round of voting on 3 June 1996. Yet the combination of his 
weakening health (he had had a heart attack during the campaign), the 
political (and financial) compromises that he had made during the electoral 
campaign towards the oligarchs (who had supported him against a 
candidate fielded by the Communist Party) and the upcoming crisis would 
limit his drive for further reforms. 
1.2 The period 1997–98, or a crisis forewarned 
The year 1997 started well for Russia: for the first time since the late 
1980s, positive growth was observed (1.4%), inflation was falling from the 
dizzying 1992 heights to below 15% a year and a new (harder) exchange 
rate regime was providing a nominal anchor for expectations (Owen & 
Robinson, 2003). In September 1997, Russia was allowed to join the Paris 
Club after rescheduling the payment of over $60 billion in Soviet debt to 
other governments. Another agreement for a 23-year debt repayment of $33 
billion was signed a month later with the London Club, this one concerning 
debts to private banks (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002). Additionally, limitations 
on the purchase of government securities by non-resident investors were 
removed, facilitating foreign investment in Russia: by late 1997, non-
residents were responsible for around 30% of the GKO22 market.23 But this 
                                                 
21 Ms Paramonova returned to the CBR in 1998, with the post-crisis team led by Mr 
Gerashchenko, and was among its Deputy Chairpersons until September 2007, 
when she became the Presidential Representative at the Russian National Banking 
Council. 
22 GKO refers to the most common short-term Russian government Treasury bill 
(Gosudarstvennoe Kratkosrochnoe Obyazatelstvo). 
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apparent relative stabilisation was misleading, as several weaknesses lurked 
under a seemingly benign environment (Owen & Robinson, 2003). 
One was Russia’s low rate of tax collection,24 which caused the public 
sector deficit to remain very high (see section 1.4.5). The majority of tax 
revenues came from taxes that were linked to a limited number of 
products, therefore exposing the Russian fiscal position to notoriously 
unstable commodity prices. Furthermore, given the new constitutional 
federal settlement under President Yeltsin, the revenue from most taxes 
was now shared between the federal and regional governments. This fiscal 
fragility was clearly reflected in the continually very high budget deficits, 
which almost hit 10% of GDP in 1996 and were above 8% in 1997 (see 
Figure 1.8 in section 1.4.5). 
Another weakness was contagion. In the summer of 1997, the Asian 
crisis caused an across-the-board reduced appetite for emerging-market 
assets among investors. In November 1997, after its onset, the ruble came 
under pressure (see section 1.4.3). The CBR was initially successful in 
defending the currency, albeit by losing nearly $6 billion (or around a third) 
from its foreign reserves. At the same time, non-resident holders of GKOs 
started signing forward contracts with Russian banks to exchange rubles 
for US dollars, which enabled them to hedge their exchange rate risks 
(forward-looking markets were already pricing in ruble devaluation). 
Another weakness – related to contagion, as similarly harder regimes 
faced comparable pressures – was also one of the apparent strengths of the 
Russian position: the exchange rate regime. The sliding peg prevented a 
nominal depreciation to correct fully for the still substantial inflation 
differential, resulting in persistent real appreciation (see Figure 1.6 in 
section 1.4.3). This situation fostered the expectation of devaluation, while 
the exchange rate framework itself provided speculators with the potential 
for profits through ‘one-sided’ positions against the currency. 
                                                                                                                            
23 John Odling-Smee, former Director of the IMF European II Department, which 
had covered the Soviet Union (in the 2000s, the European II Department 
disappeared: its portfolio of countries was divided and merged into other IMF 
geographical divisions), indicates that this liberalisation of the Russian capital 
market may have been premature and may have contributed to the 1998 crisis. He 
also maintains that the IMF should have warned Russia about this (see Odling-
Smee, 2004). 
24 In 1995, fiscal revenue plus grants was a mere 16% of GDP. By 1998, it had fallen 
below 12%. 
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Finally, the low point of the previous energy price cycle was about to 
be reached: in December 1997, the price of crude oil began to drop, putting 
additional pressure on Russia’s external position (see section 1.5.2). 
Matters came to a head during 1998, as new signs of inconsistent 
economic policies appeared. In February 1998, the Russian government 
submitted a proposal for a new tax code to the State Duma that was only 
approved later in the year, and in a much weaker version. Political risk also 
increased during 1998: unexpectedly, on 23 March 1998, Boris Yeltsin fired 
his entire government and appointed Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko, a 
relatively unknown figure, as the new Prime Minister. He was not 
confirmed in the post by the Duma until after an entire month, during 
which there was a policy vacuum. In early April, the CBR head, Sergei 
Dubinin, made public statements concerning an upcoming debt crisis, which 
were – almost on cue – followed by statements by Mr Kiriyenko about 
fiscal revenue shortfalls expected for 1998.  
Not surprisingly, the markets started pricing in a ‘default risk’ in 
Russian assets. By 18 May 1998, government bond yields had reached 
almost 50%; they would rise even further later in the month. The CBR had 
to increase its lending rate to a matching level, and in two days lost a 
further $1 billion of reserves defending the ruble from another attack. In 
June, the CBR was forced to raise its rate to 150%, and lost another $5 
billion in reserves. Meanwhile, oil prices had dropped to a historical low of 
$11 per barrel (see Figure 1.10 and section 1.5.2). 
Still in June, the government proposed a new ‘anticrisis plan’ to the 
State Duma, with added revenue-raising measures. The Duma weakened 
these provisions, limiting the additional expected RUB 71 billion in revenue 
to a trifling RUB 3 billion (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002). 
By that time, the external position of Russia had become very 
difficult: $3 billion in loans were due by late September 1998, in addition to 
the estimated several billions of US dollar/ruble futures swaps that were 
due later in the year. In July, the IMF approved a further assistance package 
worth around $10 billion, of which $4.8 billion was to be disbursed 
immediately. But this was just not enough to cover the entire expected 
external shortfall. (See Table 1.1 above for a timetable of all IMF 
programmes in Russia. It should be noted that these figures in no way 
represent the whole ‘envelope’ of external finance made available by the 
international community to Russia, which also included bilateral credits 
and grants, along with loans and grants from other international financial 
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institutions such as the World Bank and the European Commission, 
including ECFIN.)25 
On 13 August 1998, the Russian stock, bond and currency markets 
collapsed as a result of investor fears. Annual yields on ruble-denominated 
bonds skyrocketed, and the stock market had to be closed for trading after 
precipitous falls in the indexes.26 
Finally, on 17 August 1998 the Russian government formally let go of 
the hard exchange-rate framework, removing the exchange rate band and 
ultimately devaluing the ruble by over 70%. It defaulted on its domestic 
debt and declared a three-month moratorium on payments by commercial 
banks to foreign creditors. The whole government was sacked on 23 
August,27 including the head of the CBR.28 A comprehensive policy 
response to the crisis was not forthcoming, however; a fiscal package did 
                                                 
25 Some commentators (see Bluestein, 2001) question the usefulness of this last IMF 
programme. The IMF (see Odling-Smee, 2004) defends the package on the grounds 
that there was nothing essentially unsustainable about the Russian situation in the 
run-up to the 1998 crisis. Nevertheless, Odling-Smee (2004) refers to pressure from 
the G7 towards a more ‘lenient’ treatment of Russia. In any case, that was one of 
the last occasions on which the IMF had a meaningful influence on the economic 
policy debate in Russia. With the resumption of growth in the late 1990s/early 
2000s, the importance for Russia (and for other emerging markets) of the IMF and 
of its sister institution, the World Bank, would be significantly reduced (which was 
demonstrated by the IMF’s planned personnel reduction announced in late 2007). 
Arguably, the international body with the highest level of influence and leverage 
in the policy debate in Russia today is that often-underestimated organisation, the 
European Commission. 
26 From January to August 1998, the stock market lost more than 75% of its value – 
39% in May alone. 
27 Sergei Kiriyenko was replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin (whose appointment 
was twice rejected by the State Duma, leading to a government headed by Yevgeny 
Primakov). Mr Kiriyenko later became the head of the Union of Right Forces Party, 
and afterwards President Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Volga Federal District. In 
2005, he was appointed head of Rosatom, the Russian Federal Atomic Energy 
Agency. 
28 Peculiarly, Sergei Dubinin (who left government for the first time in 1994, 
because of his involvement in the Black Tuesday debacle, and who is now Deputy 
Chairman of RAO-UES) was replaced in 1998 by Viktor Gerashchenko, who would 
remain Chairman of the CBR until his retirement in 2002 (for age reasons, having 
turned 65 that year). 
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not appear until 1999, while the CBR acted to assure liquidity and the 
integrity of the payments and banking systems, also using the state-owned 
banks as tools for that purpose. Russia’s first transition had ended in tears. 
1.3 Lessons from Russia’s first transition 
The initial stabilisation and economic reform processes in Russia during the 
1990s cannot be considered a failure, as they more or less comprehensively 
implemented the fundamental institutions necessary for a market economy 
and largely opened up and integrated the Russian economy into the wider 
global economy. The Russian policy-makers who came later on would 
essentially ‘only’ have to finish this work. 
Nevertheless, these reforms were clearly incomplete and their 
weaknesses were graphically revealed by the 1998 collapse. There were 
many microeconomic deficiencies in the Russian reforms (such as an 
imperfect privatisation and incomplete price liberalisation, notably in the 
domestic energy sector), but the underlying causes of the 1998 crisis were 
mostly macroeconomic (again, admittedly with microeconomic 
underpinnings): an inconsistent policy mix, an unsustainable exchange rate 
regime and a lax fiscal stance.  
Together, these elements made the Russian economy very vulnerable 
to external shocks, and when the combined shocks of the Asian crisis 
(which reduced the risk appetite of foreign investors towards emerging 
markets across the board) and the historically very low oil prices hit during 
1997–98, the result was a full-blown, almost textbook-perfect external 
sustainability crisis. The Russian crisis itself was part of a long series of 
similar crises throughout the 1990s, linked to the fundamentally 
unsustainable nature of a hard(er) exchange rate regime without a 
consistent policy mix in an environment of liberalised capital flows. These 
crises included the 1992–93 travails of the Exchange Rate Mechanism I 
(ERM-I) in the EU, the 1994 Mexican collapse, the 1997 Asian crisis, the 
1999 Brazilian  turmoil and 2001 Argentinian experience.  
A subsequent section deals with the current Russian growth model 
and discusses how well lessons from the first transition have been learned. 
Yet before that, the next section presents in more detail the developments 
in the main macroeconomic aggregates during the 1990s and beyond. 
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1.4 Macro performance during Russia’s transitions 
This section presents a description of the main macro variables since the 
beginning of transition in Russia. The next section (1.5) will analyse those 
developments in more detail, concentrating on the more recent trends. 
1.4.1 GDP performance 
Economic data around the immediate USSR dissolution period29 is often 
very unreliable. The difficulty lies in the sometimes very severe 
information deficiencies and the lack of reliable market exchange rates, 
which limits the validity of international comparisons. In any case, a very 
significant fall in Russian GDP during the years immediately before and 
after the end of the Soviet Union can be observed (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 GDP growth rates in Russia (%) 
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Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Russian Federal State 
Statistics Service (Rosstat). 
Successive years of negative growth continued until 1996, with a brief 
period of positive growth in 1997, followed by the sharp post-crisis 
downturn of 1998. Still, it should be noted that even those several years of 
                                                 
29 This period covers 1990–92, as some of the USSR republics had effectively 
declared themselves sovereign in 1990, while others had initially been reluctant to 
declare independence even after the formal dissolution of the Union. 
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negative growth were a necessary step for the return to positive growth 
rates. This is to be expected, as necessarily the introduction of market-based 
institutions and the consequent reorganisation of the economy is not an 
instantaneous process. Using nominal exchange rates also paints a very 
stark picture of the development of the Russian economy: in 1989, Russian 
nominal GDP was around $500 billion, but fell below $200 billion in 1999 
and then jumped almost sevenfold to nearly $1.4 trillion by 2007. On the 
other hand, using the more adequate benchmark of GDP in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) terms, which takes into account the different costs of a 
standardised consumption basket among countries, Russia’s economic 
performance is much less dramatic and follows a somewhat different path. 
A mild U-shape can be observed, in which the nadir occurred in 1998, but 
GDP never fell below 58% of the 1989 height. Furthermore, by 2006 it had 
roughly returned to its 1989 level (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3). 30 
Figure 1.2 Russian GDP and GDP in PPP ($ billion) 
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Sources: WDI and Rosstat. 
The same picture holds true for GDP per capita: using an index based 
on 1989, in 2006, Russian GDP in PPP per capita had approximately 
                                                 
30 Åslund (2001) estimates that when one takes into consideration other factors 
(such as unreported or undercounted economic activities), Russian GDP had 
reached 94% of its 1989 value by 1995, implying a comparatively marginal fall of 
6%. 
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reached its 1989 level (albeit when one uses GDP in PPP per capita 
calculated using current instead of constant international US dollars, the 
1989 level had been reached by 2002, and now stands at around 150% of it). 
On the other hand, the GDP recovery of Russia relative to its 1989 level still 
lags behind that experienced by the new EU member states – although it is 
roughly comparable to that observed in the south-eastern European 
transition countries and is also at the level of the aggregate performance of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (see Figure 1.3). 
Figure 1.3 GDP index measures (base year 1989) 
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Notes: NMS = new member states; SEE = south-eastern European transition countries. 
Sources: WDI and EBRD. 
This outcome stems from the fact that while Russia’s initial growth 
performance was clearly below the aggregate of all transition countries31 
(i.e. all the previously centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans), from 1999 onwards, that has no longer been the 
                                                 
31 As a rule, all transition countries experienced several years of negative growth, 
referred to in the literature as the ‘transition recession’. This period of negative 
GDP growth is linked to the necessary time to reorganise the existing factors of 
production according to their marginal productivities and the international 
comparative advantage of the individual countries (see Vinhas de Souza & 
Havrylyshyn, 2006). It is also related to the depth of accumulated distortions: as the 
Soviet Union had been under a planned economic system for a generation longer 
than Eastern Europe, the distortions there (for instance, the degree of over-
industrialisation) were more serious. See Åslund (2001) and Kornai (1994). 
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case (see Figure 1.4). Since 1999, Russia’s performance has been quite close 
to the CIS32 and all transition averages, and has actually surpassed the 
performance of the new member states.33 
Figure 1.4 Comparative GDP growth rates (%) 
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Source: EBRD. 
1.4.2 Inflation 
In 1992, the first year of major economic reform, the consumer price index 
(CPI) in Russia increased by a whopping 2,520%. A major cause of the 
                                                 
32 The CIS average in Figure 1.4 is GDP-weighted. As Russian GDP represents 
between 75% and 80% of the total GDP of the CIS, Russia’s growth performance 
strongly determines the CIS performance. Using a reference of the CIS minus 
Russia, Russia was below this benchmark between 1996 and 1998 and after 2001. 
33 As one can see in Figure 1.4, the transitional recession in the new member states 
occurred before that in the CIS countries, as they began the transition process 
earlier than the CIS did – some as early as in the 1980s. This reveals another 
problem when comparing growth performance (or indeed, progress in reforms) 
between the CIS and other regions. Some works adjust the comparison by basing 
series on the first year of transition (termed ‘transition time’). 
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increase was the deregulation of most of the prices in January 1992: the CPI 
index increased in that month alone by 245%. This price shock was a 
positive, one-off non-monetary move that reflected the necessary and 
beneficial adjustment to world price levels. In 1993, the annual inflation rate 
had declined to 875%, which was still a very high figure; by 1994, it had 
fallen to just over 300%. In 1996, it was already below 50% yearly, and it fell 
to around 15% in 1997 (see Figure 1.5). A brief inflationary, post-
devaluation spike occurred in 1999, after which inflation decreased to 
single digits in 2006, then returned to low double digits in 2007. As one 
might see, this trajectory roughly mirrors the one observed in the CIS 
average, albeit the deflationary process was much faster in the CEE 
countries.  
Figure 1.5 CPI, pre- and post-1998 
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Source: IMF. 
These yearly averages mask substantial variations of the monthly 
inflation rates, linked to normal seasonality (for instance, the infamous, 
bitterly cold Russian winters, which affect food prices) and punctual 
‘policy’ shocks from the Russian monetary and fiscal authorities 
throughout the early to mid-1990s. In any case, the overall picture is clear: a 
rather steady but slow disinflation process. 
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1.4.3 Exchange rate dynamics 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not immediately lead to the 
establishment of a truly Russian monetary authority capable of conducting 
an independent monetary policy,34 as, until mid-1993, some of the former 
republics of the Soviet Union still used the ruble, and the central banks of 
those republics conducted their own policy simultaneously with the CBR. 
Only after 1993 did the CBR really start to conduct a national – and initially 
loose – monetary policy. During the period from July 1992, when the (now) 
Russian ruble could be legally exchanged for US dollars, to August 1998, 
the official exchange rate for the ruble/US dollar declined from RUB 1 per 
$1 to around RUB 7.9 (see Figure 1.6; prior to July 1992, the ruble rate had 
been set at a highly overvalued level).  
Figure 1.6 Exchange rate developments 
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34 The CBR was founded on 13 July 1990, based on the Russian Republic Bank of 
the State Bank of the Soviet Union (the former Gosbank). On 2 December 1990, the 
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed the Law on the Central Bank of the RSFSR 
(Bank of Russia), which declared the CBR a legal entity and the main bank of the 
Russian Federation. 
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This loose monetary stance continued until the middle of 1995, when 
the Russian economy started showing signs of stabilisation and a new CBR 
law was passed, providing the CBR with a greater degree of legal 
independence in conducting monetary policy.  
This change allowed the CBR to adopt a tighter monetary policy and 
to introduce a pegged exchange-rate regime with a crawling band against 
the US dollar, which replaced the previous ‘dirty float’ from July 1995 
onwards: the CBR announced its intention to maintain the ruble within a 
band of 4.300 to 4.900 per $1 through mid-1996.35 The announcement 
reflected strengthened fiscal and monetary policies and the build-up of 
reserves with which the CBR could defend the ruble. A direct consequence 
of this harder exchange-rate regime was an increase in the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), given the still substantial inflation differential 
between Russia and its main trading partners. 
As a result of these measures, inflation slowed down further (see 
Figure 1.5 above). Furthermore, because of favourable developments in the 
local securities market, direct credit to the government significantly 
decreased and the CBR started to conduct monetary policy through indirect 
instruments, such as interest rates and reserve requirements. Yet the start of 
the Asian crisis of 1997 spread a negative shock throughout emerging 
markets. This external shock reduced investment confidence in Russia and 
caused capital outflows, forcing the CBR to defend the band of a rapidly 
appreciating currency: by late 1997, the ruble had experienced a real 
appreciation of almost 50% when compared with 1994 (see Figure 1.6, 
above). After two rounds of further attacks during 1998, the collapse of the 
framework was to follow. It was replaced by an informal US dollar (and 
later basket) targeting. With the boom in oil prices from 1999 onwards, 
REER appreciation pressures reappeared, bringing it back to its pre-crisis 
level by 2005. 
1.4.4 External position 
Remarkably, Russia’s trade balance was always positive throughout the 
1990s: even at the low point of the oil price cycle in 1997–98, Russia was 
registering trade surpluses of at least $15 billion yearly.  
                                                 
35 The ruble would later undergo a redenomination in early 1998 that would cut 
three zeroes from its face value. 
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Also somewhat surprisingly, the current account was never in 
significant deficit – even during 1997–98, it was effectively in balance and it 
was strongly positive in most of the other years (see Figure 1.7).  
Figure 1.7 External developments 
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1.4.5 Fiscal position 
Figure 1.8 reveals the true Achilles’ heel of the Russian macroeconomic 
policy until 1998: the fragility of its fiscal position. For this entire period, fiscal 
deficits of up to 10% of GDP (or even more) were the rule (albeit the 
average CIS performance was even worse than that). 
As indicated earlier, this state of affairs stemmed from the significant 
dependency of Russia on taxes linked to commodity prices, especially 
energy ones and the imperfect nature of the fiscal pact between the 
Federation and the regions enshrined by the 1993 Constitution. Other 
contributing factors were the unwillingness of the government to enforce 
hard budget constraints in the formerly state-owned enterprises and the 
relations between the Russian government and the new industrial groups, 
which frequently enabled oligarchs to negotiate ad hoc tax treatment.  
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Figure 1.8 Balance of the federal government budget 
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Source: IMF. 
The post-2000 oil boom, plus significant reforms in the macro 
framework, would completely change the fiscal stance, to one of consistent 
and high headline fiscal surpluses. 
1.5 Post-1998 macroeconomic performance 
Confounding most international and domestic observers, Russia’s macro 
performance after the 1998 debacle has been nothing short of impressive. 
While the average growth rate for the period 1990–98 was a dismal -6.3%,36 
the average growth rate for the period 1999–2007 was a robust +7% 
(Rosstat’s 2007 growth estimate for Russia is 8.1%).37 
                                                 
36 One must note that this performance is actually better than the CIS average (non-
GDP weighted) for the same period, which was -6.8%. As a comparator, the 
average GDP growth for the new EU member states for the same period was a 
‘mere’ -1.7%. 
37 As 7% yearly growth is what is necessary for the doubling of a GDP in 10 years, 
President Putin’s promise to do so is now within sight. 
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The growth drivers for these two periods were fundamentally 
different. As indicated in the previous section, a period of negative growth 
is inevitably associated with the introduction of market economy 
institutions. The only question concerning this earlier transformation stage 
is what kinds of frameworks can mitigate and shorten it.38 
Once market economy institutions are in place, a more proper 
discussion of growth drivers is possible. That is indeed the case for Russia 
post-1998. At the same time, clear differences can be distinguished among 
the growth drivers for the sub-periods after 1998. Here, three phases of growth 
between 1999 and 2006 are broadly differentiated (following Owen & 
Robinson, 2003 and Ahrend, 2006), including indications that a new phase 
may have started in 2006: 
1) In the immediate aftermath of the 1998 crisis (1999–2000), growth was 
mainly driven by the competitiveness gains from the ruble devaluation.  
2) Energy price increases during 2001–06 along with a significant rise in oil 
production (at least until 2004) drove growth in the second period. In 
conjunction with these trends, from 2004 onwards a consumption boom 
can be observed (supported by terms-of-trade gains arising from 
energy exports and later from an increase in fiscal expenditures). 
3) In 2006, with the pick-up of investment, an investment-led growth phase 
may have begun in Russia.  
Beyond the underlying factors listed above, the cumulative 
importance of – even if limited and incomplete – structural reform and a 
more robust macro policy mix have also been crucial for growth resumption. 
1.5.1 1999–2000 
The Russian economy recovered surprisingly quickly from the 1998 crisis. 
Between 1998 and 1999, Russia experienced a truly significant fiscal 
adjustment, as the federal fiscal deficit fell from 8.1% to 3.1% of GDP (and 
turned into a surplus by 2000). These changes were partly automatic, as the 
newly increased inflation reduced real (non-indexed) expenditures, while 
(indexed) real revenues rose (Owen & Robinson, 2003). Meanwhile, 
imports fell sharply, as their prices more than tripled in ruble terms. 
                                                 
38 A usual conclusion of the transition literature is that more robust macro and 
institutional frameworks (such as those provided by the EU accession processes) 
are quite effective in reducing these adjustment costs (see Vinhas de Souza, 2004a). 
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Correspondingly, the current account surplus grew very rapidly (from 
0.1% of GDP in 1998 to a massive 12.6% of GDP in 1999). 
This quick recovery was made possible by the existence of unused 
installed capacity and by the limited domestic significance of the banking 
system (one of the sectors most affected by the 1998 crisis) in terms of 
domestic financing, which limited the negative spin-offs from the banking 
collapse. Industrial production increased again in October 1998 and by 
March 1999, it had surpassed its December 1997 level (see Figure 1.9, in 
which the substantial post-1998 jump is clearly visible).  
Figure 1.9 Monthly industrial production index (1993=100) 
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Growth was very broadly spread across industrial sectors, including 
non-resource ones, both domestically and internationally oriented (see 
Table 1.2). After the textbook-perfect crisis, this was an equally textbook-
perfect example of a considerable ‘expenditure switching’ from imports to 
domestic goods caused by a (real) devaluation. The large initial decline in 
input costs (real wages and energy prices, the latter a deliberate policy 
decision by the Russian government) enabled Russian industry to become 
competitive again both at home and abroad, while the depreciation priced 
some imports out of the market.  
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Table 1.2 Contribution of sectors to industrial production growth (%) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Electrical power -4.6 -16.7 -4.0 -1.2 1.4 2.2 -0.8 0.7 0.2 
Fuel industry 
(oil, gas, coal) 
-17.3 19.3 -47.3 18.1 28.1 53.7 65.4 61.7 57.6 
Ferrous 
metallurgy 
-3.4 6.3 -12.5 14.4 9.7 -0.2 3.1 6.4 4.4 
Nonferrous 
metallurgy 
-11.0 59.5 -10.3 14.6 14.7 8.5 10.6 7.7 5.3 
Chemical  
and petro-
chemical 
industry 
-8.8 7.6 -5.7 12.7 5.2 4.8 1.2 2.1 4.2 
Machine-
building 
industry 
-13.4 38.1 -21.8 22.2 18.6 11.8 3.6 11.3 17.3 
Wood and paper 
industry 
-21.6 3.6 0.4 10.4 5.4 2.1 1.7 0.7 1.7 
Building 
materials 
industry 
-13.2 -9.7 -3.4 3.1 2.7 2.2 1.1 1.7 1.6 
Light industry 7.0 1.9 2.2 -1.4 -1.7 -0.7 0.5 0.2 0.8 
Food industry -13.7 -9.9 2.4 7.1 15.8 15.6 13.5 7.5 6.9 
Source: Rosstat. 
1.5.2 2001–05 
From 2001 onwards, a fundamental difference began to appear in the 
Russian growth drivers, with the increased prominence of the energy sector 
(i.e. including oil, gas and coal). Its contribution to overall industrial 
growth almost doubled from 2000 to 2001, from 28% to 54% (Table 1.2). 
This change occurred on the back of significant increases in oil and gas 
prices (see Figure 1.10). 
In 1998, oil prices39 (crude oil was one of the most important Russian 
export products, even during Soviet times)40 had fallen to the historically 
                                                 
39 Gas prices also tend to move in tandem with oil prices, with a lag of a few 
months. 
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very low average price of $12.7 per barrel of UK Brent crude. As a 
comparison, this price was not only nearly half the crude price in 1990, but 
was also significantly below the post-war nominal average price of $15.1. In 
contrast, by late 2000, oil prices had surpassed $28 per barrel, more than 
120% higher than their 1998 low. 
Figure 1.10 Oil and gas prices ($) 
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The effects of these changes were dramatic. The value of total Russian 
exports barely increased between 1998 and 1999, but the share of oil in total 
exports jumped from less than a quarter to around a third. In 2000, the 
value of total exports rose by almost 40%, climbing above $100 billion for 
                                                                                                                            
40 The discovery and exploration of significant oil and gas fields in the early 1970s 
enabled a temporary increase of the USSR’s growth rates. It also markedly 
extended the degree of openness of the Soviet economy, with energy products 
quickly reaching over 50% of the total exports by value by the late 1970s (Mau & 
Starodubrovskaya, 2001). Differentiated interests emerged within the Soviet 
nomenklatura concerning economic relations with the wider world. Some authors 
(ibid.) even partially blame the fall of the Soviet Union itself on the reduction in oil 
prices that occurred during the 1980s. 
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the first time, while the share of oil came close to 40%. The consequent 
current account surplus was a huge 18% of GDP in 2000 and was to 
average 11% of GDP for the whole period 2000–06 (see Table 1.3).41 The EU 
is largely responsible for this surplus, being by far the largest trading and 
investment partner of Russia: in 2006, it was responsible for 63% of Russia’s 
exports, but for just 51% of its imports (or around 60% of total trade). 
Table 1.3 Imports, exports and the current account surplus 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports ($ billion) 75.6 105 101.9 107.3 135.9 183.5 243.6 302.3 
Imports ($ billion) 39.5 44.9 53.8 61 76.1 96.3 125.3 162.7 
Current account 
($ billion) 
24.6 46.8 33.9 29.1 35.4 60.1 83.3 95.6 
Current account 
(% of GDP) 
12.7 18 11 8.5 8.2 10.3 11.2 9.8 
Trade balance 
(% of GDP) 
18.4 23.2 15.8 11 11 12 14 12.6 
Sources: Author’s estimations, based on CBR, Rosstat and IMF. 
 
This export performance was not just the result of energy price 
increases. The 1999–2004 supply response of the Russian energy industry 
(and especially the oil sector) was quite considerable. This response can be 
seen in Table 1.4, which plots the terms of trade against nominal exports. 
Table 1.4 Terms of trade and nominal export indexes (2001=100) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Terms of trade index (2001=100) 100 103 113 128 148 159 
Export index (in nominal $, 
2001=100) 
100 105 133 180 239 298 
Sources: Author’s estimations, based on CBR and Rosstat. 
 
                                                 
41 The sterilisation of these very substantial hard currency inflows was to create a 
situation of almost permanent excess liquidity in the Russian money market. 
Consequently, real short-term interest rates have usually been negative, thus 
limiting the usefulness of the usual central bank instruments of monetary policy. 
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Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, oil production fell 
substantially, reaching a bottom of roughly 6 million barrels per day (mbd) 
or around half of the Soviet-era peak in 1986. A turnaround in Russian oil 
output began in 1999, caused by the earlier privatisation of the industry, beyond 
the rising world oil prices (the structure of the Russian energy industry is 
described in Box 1.2). This rebound has continued since 1999, resulting in a 
total production in 2007 of 9.87 mbd – over 62% more than the 1998 level, 
albeit at diminishing rates in 2005–07.42  
A somewhat similar process has also been observed in the gas 
industry, but with much smaller growth rates in production. The 2007 
production reached 653 billion cubic metres (bcm) or only 14% above the 
low point observed in 1997 (see Table 1.5). These different performances 
stem from variations in the industrial structures under which the industries 
operate (with that for oil being a relatively competitive and for the most 
part privately owned oligopoly versus the state-owned monopoly for gas) 
as well as in the related regulatory frameworks (with world level prices for oil 
regulated versus less than cost-recovery domestic prices for gas). 
Table 1.5 Production of oil and natural gas in Russia 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Oil mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd 
Production 8.02 7.11 6.38 6.16 6.05 6.14 6.09 6.12 
Growth rate – -11.3 -10.3 -3.4 -1.8 1.5 -0.8 0.5 
Natural gas bcm bcm bcm bcm bcm bcm bcm Bcm 
Production 641 618.4 607.2 595.4 601.1 571.1 591 590.7 
Growth rate – -3.5 -1.8 -1.9 1.0 -5.0 3.5 -0.1 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Oil mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd mbd 
Production 6.49 6.99 7.62 8.46 9.21 9.45 9.64 9.87 
Growth rate 6.0 7.7 9.0 11.0 8.9 2.6 2.1 2.4 
Natural gas bcm bcm bcm bcm Bcm bcm bcm bcm 
Production 584.2 581.5 594.5 620.3 634 640.6 655.5 653 
Growth rate -1.1 -0.5 2.2 4.3 2.2 1.0 2.3 -0.5 
* Provisional data for 2007 
Sources: Vinhas de Souza (2006) and Troika Dialog. 
                                                 
42 The average growth rate of production during 1999–2004 was close to 9% per 
year, but fell to around 2.4% in 2005–07. 
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Box 1.2 The structure of the Russian energy industry 
Oil  
The Russian oil industry has been reorganised in two steps, starting in 1993. 
The first phase, completed by 1994, was the transformation of the state-owned 
concerns into a number of joint stock companies. This was followed in 1995 by 
the auction of government shares in these companies. This process is still 
underway, but the trend towards privatisation has almost ground to a halt. The 
last such auction was the privatisation of the formerly state-owned Russian–
Belarusian firm Slavneft in 2002 (although some residual state shareholdings in 
already privately-owned oil companies have since been sold off, such as the 
7.6% stake in Lukoil sold to US ConocoPhilips). Today the oil sector comprises 
10 vertically integrated companies that account for almost 95% of Russia’s total 
crude oil production (see Table B1.2). Since the end of 2004, the oil sector has 
undergone significant and continual restructuring, after Yuganskneftegaz, the 
main producing asset of Yukos (previously the second-largest privately owned 
oil company), was sold at an auction and the revenue used to settle tax arrears 
claimed by the government. Yuganskneftegaz, with a production capacity of 1 
mbd, became part of the state-owned company Rosneft, raising the share of 
fully or partially state-owned firms in total oil production to roughly 34% in 
2006 (this figure includes Bashneft, Tatneft and Sibneft, which were acquired by 
Gazprom in October 2005). The only major, direct foreign player in the Russian 
oil sector is now TNK-BP, a result of the 2003 merger between Tyumen Oil 
Company (TNK) and British Petroleum (BP).† 
Table B1.2 Companies’ shares in oil and gas production in Russia 
  Oil production 
(mbd) 
% in total 
output 
Gas production 
(bcm) 
% in total 
output 
Russia Total 9.7 100.0 655.5 100.0 
Lukoil 1.8 18.9 12.0 1.8 
Rosneft (+Yuganskneftegaz)* 1.6 17.0 13.7 2.1 
TNK–BP 1.5 15.0 8.5 1.3 
Surgutneftegaz 1.3 13.7 14.7 2.2 
Gazprom/GazpromNeft* 0.9 9.6 550.2 83.9 
Tatneft* 0.5 5.2 – – 
Slavneft 0.5 4.9 – – 
Yukos 0.4 4.5 – – 
RussNeft 0.3 3.1 – – 
Bashneft* 0.2 2.5 – – 
NOVATEK – – 30.0 4.6 
Other producers 0.6 5.7 26.3 4.0 
* State-owned or participated.  
Sources: Vinhas de Souza (2006) and Troika Dialog. 
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That being said, the importance of the other natural resource sectors 
should not be underestimated, especially given the fact that the 
contribution of the energy sector to growth in Russia has been declining for 
years now (Ahrend, 2006). The natural resource sectors43 indeed directly 
                                                 
43 The natural resource sectors include fuel (oil and gas), nonferrous metals and 
forestry. 
Box 1.2, cont. 
Gas  
Unlike the oil sector, the gas industry has never truly departed from the 
ownership structure inherited from the Soviet period. Prices are regulated, 
exports are monopolised and the domestic market is dominated by the state-
controlled, vertically integrated quasi-monopoly, Gazprom. Gazprom holds 
nearly one-third of the world’s natural gas reserves, produces around 84% of all 
Russia’s natural gas, supplies gas to generate close to 50% of the country’s 
electricity and operates its own natural gas pipeline grid. Gazprom is also 
Russia’s largest individual earner of hard currency and the company’s tax 
payments make up almost 25% of the total federal tax revenues. Oil companies 
and independent gas producers account for around 16% of total domestic gas 
production, but about a quarter of this is flared (i.e. directly burned into the 
atmosphere after extraction, as a by-product of oil extraction). This practice 
largely stems from unprofitable gas processing and sales conditions for these 
producers compared with Gazprom. In most cases, these other producers have 
to sell the gas to Gazprom or Gazprom has to provide pipeline access to deliver 
the gas to non-Gazprom buyers. Through Gazprom, Russia also controls most 
of the gas supply routes from the Caspian and Central Asian regions to Europe 
(Kalyuzhnova, 2005) and a large share of their production, under long-term 
reselling contracts. Nevertheless, despite its size and market power, Gazprom is 
seriously limited by domestic over-regulation: the company must supply 
natural gas used to heat and power Russia’s domestic market at government-
regulated prices set below cost-recovery levels. A timetable for the full 
deregulation of domestic energy prices by 2011 has recently been announced, 
however (see next section).  
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
† In February 2003, BP purchased a 50% stake in TNK, as well as other assets held by 
TNK’s shareholders, for $7 billion – a figure representing the largest single foreign 
investment in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The joint company TNK-BP 
produced 1.45 mbd in 2006, having lost the rank of second-largest oil producer in Russia 
to Rosneft in 2005. 
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contributed around 28% to GDP growth during 2000–06 and the oil 
industry alone close to 19%.44 Still, the contribution of the energy sector to 
industrial growth was actually negative until 1998; it seems to have peaked 
in 2002 and then fallen to 10% by 2006 (according to preliminary 
estimations, see Figure 1.11).  
Figure 1.11 Sector contributions to GDP growth (%) 
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When discussing sectoral contributions to growth in Russia, one must 
note that Russian official data present a somewhat distorted picture of the 
importance of the natural resource sectors, because a substantial share of 
the value added generated by them is reflected not in the accounts of the 
extraction companies, but in the accounts of their affiliated trading 
companies. As a result, the export-oriented industries are under-
represented in the industrial production figures and the industry as a 
                                                 
44 On the other hand, as Owen & Robinson (2003) point out, there are likely 
additional indirect contributions of the energy sector to overall growth (through 
consumption, investment and government revenue) that are not taken into account 
by this methodology. 
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whole is under-represented as a share of Russia’s GDP, while the trade and 
services sectors are over-represented.  
There have been attempts to correct these distortions. Estimates by 
the World Bank (2003) using figures for 2000 raise the share of industry in 
GDP from 27% to 41% and the share of the oil and gas sectors from around 
8% to just above 19%, while revising the share of the services sectors 
downwards from 60% to 46%. The Russian Ministry of Finance produced 
similar estimates that suggest that the share of the oil and gas sectors in 
GDP was around 21% in 2000 and around 17% thereafter (given that the 
growth rates of the energy sector lag considerably behind those of Russia’s 
GDP, this reduction in importance has likely continued). Figure 1.12 shows 
the structure of industrial value added by sector under the official and 
adjusted weights. The estimations of sectoral contributions to industrial 
growth presented in Figure 1.11 above use the corrected weights derived 
from the World Bank (2003) study. 
Figure 1.12 Structure of industrial value added in 2000 (with official data in the 
top panel and adjusted data from the World Bank in the bottom panel) 
Sources: Rosstat and World Bank. 
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performance in Russia is linked, to a very considerable degree, to the effects 
of liberalisation reforms in the non-energy sectors of the economy.45 
The main GDP driver from a demand-side perspective during this 
period was the increase in private consumption, with its GDP share rising by 
5% between 2000 and 2006 (see Figure 1.13). This rise was supported by 
increases in real disposable incomes and the appreciation of the exchange 
rate. Real wages grew by around 130% during 1999–2004 and were more 
than 40% above the 1998 levels at the end of this period. 
Figure 1.13 Demand-side components of GDP, 1999–2006 
Source: IMF. 
                                                 
45 Which of these two elements, oil prices or reforms, has been more important for 
growth resumption in Russia so far? There is no precise way to assess this, as oil 
prices and reforms interact in complex ways (one can argue that oil prices hinder 
reforms – the ‘resource curse’ argument – but they also provide a source of funds 
that can enable costly reforms to be undertaken). Nonetheless, estimating a simple, 
naïve regression of GDP growth rates on oil prices and the EBRD’s Transition 
Indicator for Russia shows that the Transition Indicator variable has a considerably 
higher (and always positive) coefficient than the one associated with oil prices, 
which can even have a negative sign (albeit neither of the two is always significant). 
This outcome is robust to the use of the variables in changes or index terms, and to 
their use in a contemporaneous or lagged format. It is also mostly robust to sample 
changes (using a sample for either 1989–2006 or 1998–2006).  
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Therefore, during this period, growth was increasingly driven by 
consumption, but sustained by rising export volumes (Owen & Robinson, 
2003; Ahrend, 2006). The contribution of net exports to growth was small 
but positive, as export volume growth counteracted the upward trend in 
imports. In 2005, however, this changed. Consumption growth accelerated, 
supported by fiscal stimulus. This increase supported the expansion of the 
services sectors, but its impact on the domestically-oriented manufacturing 
sector was relatively limited. Additionally, a slowdown in the mining 
sectors was observed, mainly driven by crude extraction. As a result, the 
contribution of net exports to growth turned negative in 2005. 
This slowdown was a consequence of the fall in oil sector investment 
(even as oil prices rose, capital expenditure by oil companies in Russia fell 
in real terms during 2004).46 This investment fall was in turn caused by a 
deterioration of the business climate, as the footprint of the state in the 
economy expanded, exemplified by the notorious Yukos case. (When 
Yukos, previously the largest privately owned oil company in Russia was 
driven to bankruptcy by claims of alleged back taxes, its assets were sold 
mostly to state-owned companies and its owners were sent to prison.) A 
softening of oil prices in late 2006 to early 2007 aggravated this trend. 
1.5.3 2006–07: The beginnings of a new growth cycle? 
2006 and 2007 were further good economic years for Russia, with increases 
in growth and further cuts in inflation and unemployment. Even so, these 
years also brought deeper changes, which may herald a new Russian 
growth model: 
• Russia has experienced a strong reversal of its traditional capital 
outflows. Yearly inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have 
reached 3.2% of GDP – a value similar to other major emerging 
economies. 
• Finally, after several years of robust growth, investment in 2006 was 
the most dynamic demand-side component of GDP. The roughly 22% 
investment share of GDP is in line with the OECD average. 
                                                 
46 An increase in energy-sector capital expenditure in nominal US dollars was 
observed in 2004, linked to the Sakhalin I and II Production Sharing Agreement 
projects. Still, owing to the strong appreciation of the ruble to the US dollar in that 
year, total oil sector investment in ruble terms declined (Ahrend, 2006). 
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Moreover, 2007 represents the ninth consecutive year of strong 
growth in Russia, supported by domestic demand – especially investment – 
and increasing energy prices. In 2006, real GDP growth was 7.4%, up from 
6.4% in 2005. As indicated above, the Rosstat estimate for 2007 growth is 
8.1%, with nominal Russian GDP expected to reach close to $1.35 trillion by 
end-2007 (or larger than the size of the Spanish GDP). The key factors 
behind this higher-than-expected growth are  
1) an acceleration of investment spending, supported by a continuation 
of the very significant increase of net capital inflows observed since 
full capital account liberalisation in mid-2006;  
2) a rebound in oil prices, after the softening observed in late 2006/early 
2007; and  
3) the increase in public spending connected with the 2007–08 electoral 
cycle. 
On the demand side, the most notable development in 2006–07 has 
been the take-off of investment (with gross capital formation having soared 
by almost 21% year-on-year (yoy) in 2007, compared with 17.5% in 2006).47 
Government spending has also accelerated. At the same time, overall 
consumption growth, still the main driver of growth, has decelerated, 
while net exports have amplified their negative contribution to growth (-
14.3% in 2006).  
                                                 
47 Russia has been able to achieve and sustain the high growth rates of the past 
decade despite comparatively low investment and significantly lower FDI inflows 
per capita (on this point, see the FDI discussion in section 2.3), even when 
compared with most other CIS economies. During 2001–04, investment as a share 
of GDP reached around 18%, which is significantly below the level of other fast-
growing emerging economies and well below the OECD average of around 22%. 
Growth has been possible partially because of the existence of considerably unused 
installed capacity, which by late 2006 had fallen to 15%. On the other hand, it must 
be noted that in early transition economies investment is usually not significant for 
growth. This is because transition economies’ initial growth is not analogous to the 
normal long-term equilibrium growth path. As Vinhas de Souza & Havrylyshyn 
(2006) point out, the dynamics in this period were not a matter of moving the 
economy to a higher production possibility frontier (PPF) through the expansion of 
factor inputs or technological change, but rather a matter of correcting the large 
inefficiencies of the communist period, moving from within the scope of the PPF to 
the outer edge of the PPF, and shifting resource allocation along the PPF to an 
internationally comparative advantage position. 
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Reflecting these developments, industrial production growth in 2006 
was below 4%, but grew rapidly in 2007, reaching 7.9% by the end of the 
year. This performance of the construction and trade sectors was also 
strong (with yoy growth rates of, respectively, 16.4% and 12%), with the 
extraction of mineral resources (oil and gas) showing a mere 0.3% increase 
yoy (after 1.6% in 2006). 
This continued, robust growth performance has led to a further 
significant fall in unemployment, which reached 6.1% in December 2007 
(according to the International Labour Organisation methodology), 
compared with 6.9% at the end of 2006. Major metropolitan areas (Moscow 
and St Petersburg) effectively face labour shortages in many sectors. 
Correspondingly, real disposable income has grown by up to 14% yoy in 
2007. 
The 2007 trade surplus fell below 10% of GDP, from 14% in 2006. This 
reduction reflects the low growth of export volumes and the continued 
growth of import volumes at substantially higher rates than those of 
exports. Similarly, the current account surplus declined from almost 10% of 
GDP in 2006 to below 6% in 2007. 
An implication of this reduction in the current account surplus is the 
consequent decline of the excess liquidity that has been hampering 
monetary policy (see section 2.2.2). If this trend persists, the currently 
negative, real short-term interest rates may turn positive, affecting both 
households and firms, and enabling the CBR to become a liquidity provider 
in the interbank market (as it did during the financial turbulence of August 
2007, also discussed below). 
For this to happen, however, the capital account should not fully 
compensate the reduction in the current account balance. In another 
development, FDI flowing into Russia – an area in which the country has 
traditionally underperformed – more than doubled between 2005 and 2006, 
from $14.6 billion to $31 billion. FDI yearly inflows as a share of GDP stand 
at over 3.2% (up from 2% in 2005), a level very similar to other major 
emerging markets such as China. Total net private-sector capital inflows 
reached $41.6 billion, up from $1.1 billion in 2005, reversing the persistent 
net capital outflows since 1994. This positive performance seems to have 
continued during 2007, as discussed in the next chapter. 
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What can one conclude from this chapter? After the troubled 1990s, 
Russia has so far effectively used the opportunity provided by high oil 
prices after 1999. When compared with similarly large emerging markets 
(some of which are also countries exporting substantial natural resources), 
Russia has the second-best 1999–2006 growth performance, with an average 
growth rate of 6.7% (just below China’s performance of 9.2%, which, by any 
historical yardstick, is truly exceptional). Figure 1.14 shows that Russia 
comfortably beats the 5.4% average of the comparator group of BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) plus Saudi Arabia.48  
Figure 1.14 Growth in large emerging markets, 1999–2006 (%) 
Source: IMF. 
 
                                                 
48 Beck, Kamps & Mileva (2007) estimate the current (i.e. without any additional 
growth-enhancing structural reform) long-term growth potential of Russia to be 
within the robust 4-6% interval. 
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As pointed out above, Russia could be on the verge of switching to a 
more sustainable growth model, driven by higher domestic investment and 
FDI inflows.49 To take full advantage of this situation, making growth truly 
sustainable in the long run, the necessary macroeconomic frameworks and 
structural reforms have to be in place. These are dealt with in the next 
chapters. 
                                                 
49 One could also point out that the high endowment of human capital in Russia is 
potentially supportive of such an economic diversification strategy. The Russian 
population is highly educated: secondary enrolment in 2004 was 93%, while 
tertiary enrolment was 65%. This rate is very similar to high-income countries and 
far above the rate in BRIC countries, such as China (15%). On the other hand, 
indicators of spending on education remain below the BRIC average. Russia also 
produces a much greater share of graduates in science and engineering subjects 
than higher-income countries. The number of persons in R&D per million of 
population is comparable to Germany and much higher than in the BRICs: in 2005, 
Russia had almost 1 million persons engaged in R&D activities. This figure is 
similar to China’s, and about half of the EU-25 figure.  
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2. RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN: 
THE INCOMPLETE REFORM AGENDA 
s indicated at the beginning of this book, economic reform has to be 
placed within the political constraints of a particular situation. For 
Russia in the late 1990s, this meant the change between the first 
and second Presidents of the Russian Federation, from Boris Yeltsin to 
Vladimir Putin. This chapter describes the reforms undertaken during the 
two terms of Vladimir Putin's Presidency, and the remaining main reform 
challenges. 
2.1 Russia under Vladimir Putin 
2.1.1 Filling the reform vacuum 
After a bruising 1996 re-election campaign (which left him beholden to the 
oligarch class), the traumatic 1998 crisis and the muddled policy response 
to it,50 not to mention his clearly worsening health, President Yeltsin was a 
diminished political figure, no longer capable of spearheading reform. The 
search for his successor began.  
On 9 August 1999 – less than a year after the 1998 crisis – Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Putin, a former KGB/FSB officer with long international 
experience (he had served for many years in the former East Germany) and 
who had participated in one of the first reformist regional governments in 
his native St Petersburg, was appointed Prime Minister by Boris Yeltsin. He 
replaced Sergei Stepashin. Mr Yeltsin also announced that he wished to see 
Vladimir Putin as his successor.  
                                                 
50 The policy response was exemplified by the inconsistent Maslyukov plan, named 
after First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, which largely relied on 
proposed fiscal easing as a way to cushion the crisis. 
A 
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On 31 December 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned, three months before the 
end of his term. Vladimir Putin was appointed acting President of the 
Russian Federation.51 Snap presidential elections were held on 26 March 
2000, which Mr Putin duly won. (On 14 March 2004, he would be re-elected 
for a second term, with 71% of the vote.)  
Vladimir Putin moved fast to fill the reform vacuum left by the final 
years of the Yeltsin administration. By mid-2000, a comprehensive reform 
plan that would essentially map out economic reform in Russia for the next 
eight years had already been designed and approved. This was the Gref 
plan (see Box 2.1). Most of its economic policy items have been effectively 
implemented – even if partially – while the social policy items have lagged 
behind (although some of the 2007 pre-election four National Priority 
Projects, in education, health, housing and agriculture can actually be 
traced back to the Gref plan). 
It is perhaps more discerning to see President Putin’s government not 
so much as a non-reforming one, as is frequently portrayed, but as an 
uneasy conjunction of a solidly reforming ‘quartet’ of institutions – the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade 
(MEDT), the CBR and the recently created Federal Service for Financial Markets 
– that share political space with a nationalist and statist circle, the so-called 
siloviki.52 These two circles frequently run inconsistent and parallel economic 
policies, and their relative influence has varied in accordance with the 
economic cycle (and the related strength of oil prices). In any case, this 
reformist group of institutions has been quite effective in pushing for 
liberalising reforms. This is partly owing to their permanence, as essentially 
the same group of people has run these institutions from the beginning of 
Vladimir Putin’s government, and most of them have worked with Mr 
Putin since his initial experience in government in St Petersburg.53 In 
                                                 
51 In his first decree on that day, Mr Putin granted Boris Yeltsin and his family legal 
immunity from prosecution in Russia. 
52 Siloviki refers to former (or, in some cases, still active) members from the security 
services (KGB/FSB) and the military. 
53 The cabinet reform of September 2007 elevated Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin 
to Deputy Prime Minister and replaced MEDT Minister German Gref (who became 
Chairman of Sberbank) by another reformer, Elvira Nabiullina (herself a co-author 
of the Gref plan). As shown in the previous chapter, the degree of personnel 
continuity within the Russian government is considerably deeper than one realises 
at first sight. 
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December 2007, President Putin anointed (as did Boris Yeltsin) his 
successor, Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, who is a member of his St 
Petersburg circle and currently First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, 
responsible for the implementation of the National Priority Projects along 
with being Chairman of Gazprom. He was duly elected in March 2008, and 
appointed Putin as his Prime Minister. 
Box 2.1 President Putin as an economic reformer: The Gref plan 
In July 2000, the Russian government published the “Social & Economic Policy 
Programme 2000–2010”. (It is also known as the Gref plan, after German Gref, the 
Minister for Economic Development and Trade and head of the think tank Centre for 
Strategic Research, who authored most of the plan in conjunction with the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, a think tank linked to the Ministry of Finance.) The key measures 
in this plan are  summarised below. 
Social policy. Objectives: i) to improve the protection of socially vulnerable 
households; ii) to ensure universal accessibility to and an acceptable quality of basic 
social benefits, especially for health care and education; iii) to enable working-age 
individuals to enjoy higher consumption levels based on their own income; and iv) 
to attract household and enterprise funds to help finance social sector institutions. 
Priority social policy measures by sector include: 
• an increase of public spending on education and an improvement of the 
transparency of financial flows in the education sector; 
• the restructure of small rural schools and the establishment of federal and 
regional educational standards;  
• the provision of full financing to fulfil state guarantees for the delivery of free 
health care to the public, and an expansion of the range of organisational and 
legal forms of health care institutions; 
• the reform of labour legislation, including the Labour Code, with a view to 
increasing labour mobility and improving the balance of interests between 
workers, employers and the state. Termination procedures are to be 
simplified. The financing of unemployment benefits are to be transferred to 
the federal budget. Increases in the minimum wage are to be continued; and 
• the reform of social assistance on the principle of providing mostly targeted 
assistance, only to households whose consumption is below the subsistence 
level. Social category-based federal benefits are to be eliminated except for 
groups like war veterans and invalids, and such benefits transformed into cash 
payments. Real pensions are to rise while ensuring the financial sustainability 
of the system. A funded pillar is to be set up in the pension system. Pensions 
are to be indexed to a combination of wages and prices. Consideration is to be 
given to the need for gradual adjustment of the pension age. Subsidies are to be 
cut and housing benefits increasingly targeted. 
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Box 2.1, cont. 
Economic policy. Objectives: i) to establish legislative principles promoting a 
favourable business and investment climate; ii) to reduce the tax burden substantially 
while ensuring medium-term financial stability; and iii) to stimulate progressive 
structural changes in the economy, reform the infrastructure monopolies, develop the 
financial infrastructure and foster the development of Russia’s technical and research 
potential.  
Priority economic policy measures by sector include 
• an improvement in the protection of property rights, including laws to protect 
shareholder and creditor rights, and intellectual property rights. Equal 
competition conditions are to be created, including the elimination of most 
direct and indirect subsidies to inefficient companies. Excessive state 
interference in business is to be reduced, with simplified registration and 
licensing procedures and reductions in the numbers of inspection and 
monitoring bodies. International Accounting Standards are to be introduced 
and financial disclosure requirements vigorously enforced; 
• banking system reform, including legal amendments to facilitate the 
liquidation of unviable banks, and the development of deposit insurance. With 
respect to capital market expansion, the range of available financial 
instruments is to be extended, tax incentives are to be introduced to encourage 
the growth of non-government pension funds and investment in Russian 
securities, and capital market regulation is to be improved. Mortgage markets 
are to be developed. The emergence of national insurance companies is to be 
encouraged through tax incentives, legislation on mandatory insurance and 
the development of a public regulation and supervisory system; 
• tax reform, with reductions to the average customs duty rates and their 
diversity (in concordance with accession negotiations with the World Trade 
Organisation), the elimination of customs privileges and the introduction of 
new customs administration technologies. Fiscal policy objectives include the 
elimination of non-funded mandates, an inventory of public assets and 
liabilities, the evaluation of public expenditure effectiveness and steps to 
ensure an appropriate, transparent allocation of expenditure responsibility and 
resource availability to different levels of government. Inflation is to be 
reduced to low levels by targeting money supply growth, the range of 
available monetary policy instruments is to be extended and the payments 
system is to be modernised; 
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Box 2.1, cont. 
• the privatisation of a significant number of state-owned enterprises and 
improvements to state property management. State funding is to be provided 
for R&D and venture investment. The military-industrial complex is to be 
restructured to increase efficiency, reduce energy intensity and encourage 
conversion to civilian use. Competitive agricultural product markets are to be 
established; and 
• reform of the infrastructure monopolies, including restructuring to separate 
naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities, improvements in 
the network access for independent gas producers and rail operators, the de-
monopolisation of electricity generation and telecoms, significant reductions in 
the lists of customers whose energy supply may not be cut off and reductions 
in cross-subsidies between categories of customers. Energy efficiency is to be 
encouraged, the taxation of the fuel and energy sector is to be improved and 
the legislation on Production Sharing Agreements is to be developed. 
Source: IMF. 
 
2.1.2 Is Russia such a poor reformer? 
As exemplified in the previous chapter concerning growth, when 
evaluating Russia’s overall performance in economic reform, it is essential 
to use adequate benchmarks. The usual comparison with other former 
centrally planned economies in Central Europe is not fully correct. In those 
economies, the process of integration into the EU implied binding structural 
reforms imposed by the powerful external anchor of the EU accession 
process.54 For the CIS, no such strong external anchor exists. Therefore, 
Russia’s reform process should be compared with clusters of countries that 
do not benefit from such external constraints. 
Using a traditional index of reform – the transition indicator55 of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – to compare 
Russia with clusters of other transition countries reveals several things (see 
Figure 2.1). 
 
                                                 
54 This statement is no way implies the questioning of the overall desirability of 
external anchors for reform. 
55 For a description of the indicator, see EBRD (several issues). 
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Figure 2.1 EBRD transition indicators for Russia and regional groups 
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2
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Source: EBRD. 
 
First, Russia outperforms the CIS average and with increasing 
distance (in other words, Russia is reforming faster than the CIS (non-GDP 
weighted) average, which includes some very slow reformers). Second, 
Russia is very close to the average of the Balkans, which includes two EU 
candidate countries, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (which together raise the average reform performance of the 
Balkan countries). Third, progress in structural reform in Russia as 
measured by the transition indicator resumed in 2006 after a hiatus in 2004–
05.56 Finally, the new EU member states from Eastern Europe clearly 
outperform all the other groupings, as one should expect. It is possible to 
                                                 
56 This hiatus was linked to an expansion of the role of the state in the economy, as 
demonstrated by the takeover of Yukos. That move led to a reduction of the 
private sector share in GDP from 70% to 65% between 2004 and 2005. In 2006, the 
share stabilised at 65%. This figure still puts Russia above the CIS average of 56%, 
and at the same level of other large CIS economies such as Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine, and just above the south-eastern European and overall transition 
economy average of 64% (but considerably below the new member state average of 
73%). 
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identify the specific reform areas in which Russia underperforms (not 
shown in Figure 2.1 above – see EBRD, several issues): these are 
competition policy, corporate governance and enterprise restructuring (i.e. 
microeconomic and structural areas, arguably more difficult to reform; 
conversely, Russia performs better on more traditional macro areas of 
reform). 
Using other transition country indicators, Russia also shows a mixed 
performance in improving its business environment (equally a 
microeconomic/structural concern). For instance, according to the results 
of the EBRD–World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), between 2002 and 2005, private sector 
perceptions of the level of effectiveness of the judiciary, the extent of 
corruption and labour regulation worsened – substantially in the case of 
corruption. At the same time, the perception of customs and trade 
regulations, business licensing and permits, and tax administration 
improved. Significantly, Russia is below the CIS average in all these 
categories, but tellingly its performance is strikingly similar to the other 
resource-rich CIS economies, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
Going beyond the set of transition economies, how does Russia 
compare with other large emerging markets? This question has particular 
relevance given that, for instance, when a foreign investor is evaluating the 
decision to engage in an FDI operation in Russia, his or her comparator 
country will not necessarily be Estonia, Slovenia or even Poland, but rather 
other resource/endowment-rich BRIC giants like Brazil, China or India.  
One can do that sort of comparison using the global World Bank 
survey of business regulations and their enforcement, entitled Doing 
Business 2008 (which refers to 2007 data). There, Russia ranks 106th out of 
178 countries, above countries such as Brazil and India but behind China 
(this is a relative deterioration compared with its 2006 ranking of 96th out of 
175 countries, although the changes in the index methodology and in the 
sample of countries make inter-year comparisons rather difficult). Russia is 
close to the average rank of the CIS countries (this average is significantly 
influenced by one country, Georgia, which is now classified as one of the 20 
easiest places in the world to do business), and above EU-leaning countries 
like Ukraine (see Figure 2.2). The areas in which Russia performs worst 
when compared with the CIS average are “licensing requirements”, 
“dealing with workers” (where its stands at roughly the EU and OECD 
averages) and “trading across borders” (export and import costs are 
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comparatively high in Russia, which is partially related to the sheer size of 
the country). On the other hand, it ranks above the OECD and the EU on 
items like “enforcing contracts” (19th),57 “registering property” (45th) and 
“starting a business” (50th). 
Figure 2.2 Doing Business 2008 rankings for Russia and others 
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The ease of doing business index ranks 1 (best) to 178 (worst).
 
Source: World Bank. 
 
Another set of global World Bank statistics, its Governance 
Indicators, presents a consistent picture with the results of the Doing 
Business survey, but not necessarily with the BEEPS. According to these 
indicators, between 2002 and 2004 an improvement was observed in 
“government effectiveness”, “rule of law” and “control of corruption”, 
whereas “regulatory quality” and “voice and accountability” worsened. 
Here also, the quality of Russia’s business environment compares relatively 
favourably with that of the other major emerging economies.  
When one uses the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report 2007, a similar global benchmarking index, Russia ranks 58th out of 
131 countries – the highest rank of all CIS countries covered and ahead of 
                                                 
57 This ranking admittedly may come as a surprise to BP, Shell or Yukos investors. 
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three EU member states and Brazil, but below China and India. Russia’s 
main weaknesses here are “institutions” (it fares close to the bottom in 
‘usual suspect’ categories like protection of minority shareholders and 
property rights) and in “goods market efficiency” (where it ranks much 
lower on some items related to FDI). 
The overall conclusion from this section is that Russia, albeit far from 
being a model reformer, does not necessarily do badly when compared 
with adequate benchmarks. Furthermore, the perception of an overall 
slowdown in reforms is not necessarily accurate.58 
This observation, of course, does not mean that further reforms are 
not necessary (especially in more microeconomic and structural areas) – far 
from it. The following sections look at specific components of the 
macroeconomic framework and the various sets of structural policies of the 
Russian Federation. 
2.2 Fiscal and monetary institutions and the financial system 
2.2.1 Recent fiscal performance and fiscal institutions 
Russia’s headline fiscal position has substantially improved since 1998, in 
line with the increase in energy prices. A prudent fiscal policy has arguably 
been the single most important factor in the economic recovery since 1998. 
The federal budget swung from a deficit of almost 6% of GDP to a 
surplus of 7.4% in 2006 (see Figure 1.8 above). The growth of energy-
related revenues was fundamental to this outcome: in 2000, the combined 
share of oil and gas revenues amounted to 22% of total federal budget 
revenues (or 3.4% of GDP), but this share climbed to 50% (or nearly 12% of 
GDP) in 2006. The increase reflects both higher energy prices and 
significant rises in oil taxation.59 Also important for Russia’s fiscal 
                                                 
58 In any case, it is also true that Russia, having started at roughly the same level as 
that of Eastern Europe, is now clearly behind the new EU member states in terms 
of reforms. 
59 Partially reflecting the power of the oligarch class in influencing government 
policy in Russia, mineral export taxes were actually abolished in 1996, but 
reintroduced in 1999. In 2002, a new tax on minerals production (equivalent to a 
royalty) was introduced as part of a further tax reform for the oil sector. It replaced 
a number of earlier taxes related to oil production and simplified the overall tax 
system. This last reform established a maximum rate for the oil export tax linked to 
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sustainability was the fiscal reform undertaken in 2001, which unified and 
lowered income tax brackets. Additionally, the re-centralisation of revenue 
at the federal level under President Putin, reversing the frequently ad hoc 
arrangements with the regions stemming from the Yeltsin period, had a 
major role in this process. 
Fiscal indicators other than the headline deficit/surplus, however, 
show a less rosy picture. Among those, the constant oil price fiscal balance60 is 
used to evaluate how fiscal policy responds to the oil price cycle. The non-
oil fiscal balance61 is used to evaluate how the fiscal position is affected by 
the inflow of oil revenues and how actual fiscal policy differs from the 
‘optimal’ fiscal policy in the presence of non-renewable resources such as 
oil and gas. The constant oil price fiscal balance in Russia, using a $20 
benchmark, deteriorated between 2001 and 2003, but showed a modest 
improvement in 2004, before worsening substantially again in 2005 and 
2006. Similarly, the non-oil federal government fiscal balance reached a 
deficit of -3.8% of GDP in 2006; it is forecast to reach -4.3% in 2007 (IMF 
estimates).62 
                                                                                                                            
the world oil price. The tax regime for the oil sector underwent further significant 
changes in 2004, leading to an added increase in the tax burden on the sector, 
particularly on oil exports. The new, more progressive scale of taxation seeks to 
withdraw the ‘additional profits’ from oil exporters when world oil prices are high, 
while at the same time lightening the overall tax burden. 
60 The constant oil price fiscal balance takes as a benchmark the long-term oil price 
level. The implicit assumption underlying it is that the price of oil tends to revert to 
this long-term benchmark, so an ‘optimal’ fiscal policy should aim at balancing the 
fiscal position with oil revenues at this long-term level. 
61 In order to maximise welfare over the long term, a country endowed with a 
given amount of non-renewable resources should smooth consumption and non-
renewable resource taxation; for instance, revenues coming from oil and gas 
should first be partly accumulated in an oil investment fund and used in principle 
only after the depletion of the non-renewable resources (see IMF, various years). 
The implication of such a policy is that the non-oil primary balance should be constant 
over time, but the level of the optimal primary balance is not predetermined, as it 
depends on many variables (the amount of non-renewable resources, the social 
discount rate, etc.). 
62 This figure does not include the increase in revenue after the elimination of the 
offshore oil arrangement with Belarus, which is expected to increase Russian fiscal 
revenues by at least $1 billion (European Commission, 2007). 
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Helped by high growth, federal spending remained below 15% of 
GDP in both 2004 and 2005 despite significant nominal increases.63 
Nevertheless, as Russia is a federal nation,64 the regional dimension has to 
be included: the unified regional budgets add another 14% to the previous 
figures – in other words, they are as large as the federal budget itself. 
Together with off-budget social funds, the regional budgets bring the 
consolidated government expenditures in Russia to more than 30% of GDP 
(see Table 2.1).  
Furthermore, unlike the federal government, Russian regions posted 
only a marginal surplus in 2004 and 2005 (0.3-0.2% of GDP), largely 
because regional budgets have only been able to benefit indirectly from 
higher energy prices, through an increase in profit tax revenues (which 
reached close to 40% of the total regional budget tax revenues in 2005, 
before federal transfers). Federal transfers have also fallen, as the Russian 
‘fiscal federalism’ arrangement seems to be evolving away from the present 
equalisation schemes towards a regional policy based on a ‘differentiation’ 
approach (with the application of regional fiscal rules that reward, among 
other things, budgetary performance). 
In any case, the 2006 federal budget surplus (Russia has had budget 
surpluses since 2000) was roughly at the same level as in 2005, despite the 
significant rise in expenditure, and far above the government-projected 
forecast in the 2006 budget of 3.2% (this forecast was based on a 
conservative oil price assumption of $40 per barrel in the 2006 budget).  
Since 2006, Russia has embarked on a strong fiscal expansion 
programme, linked to the 2007–08 election cycle.65 Non-interest 
expenditures in the 2007 budget are set to increase by around 1% of GDP at 
the federal level. This increase follows a previous one during 2006. Most of 
this increase (around 0.7% of GDP) is linked to the pre-electoral National 
                                                 
63 This total includes the 2005 cut in the transfers from the unified social tax to the 
Russian pension fund; non-interest expenditure excluding the unified social tax 
actually rose by almost 2% of GDP in 2005.  
64 Russia has 84 administrative units, which include autonomous and ethnic 
republics, oblasts, krais, okrugs and the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg (not to 
mention over 24,000 municipalities). 
65 The parliamentary elections were held in December 2007, which were 
comfortably won by the ruling party, United Russia, and the presidential elections 
in March 2008, with Dmitry Medvedev receiving over 70% of the vote. 
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Priority Projects in the areas of agriculture, education, health and housing. 
The budget surplus fell to 5.5% of GDP in 2007 (in August 2007, it was still 
at 7.1% of GDP). Russia’s twin surpluses (in the fiscal and external 
accounts) have also enabled the country to reduce its gross public debt to a 
massive extent (i.e. including both external and domestic debt), which was 
halved between 2005 and 2006 (from 16.4% of GDP to 8.6%). 
Table 2.1 Summary of operations of the enlarged government, 2000–05 
(% of GDP) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
General government        
 Overall balance 3.1 2.7 0.7 1.5 4.9 8.1 7.4 
 Primary balance 7.4 5.4 2.8 3.2 6.3 9.2 8.1 
 Revenues  36.8 37.3 37.7 36.3 36.8 40.0 41.0 
 Expenditures 33.7 34.6 37.0 34.9 31.9 31.9 32.8 
Federal government        
 Overall balance 0.8 2.7 1.3 1.7 4.3 7.5 7.4 
 Primary balance 5.2 5.4 3.4 3.4 5.5 8.4 – 
 Revenues  15.4 17.8 17.2 16.8 17.6 22.5 23.2 
 Expenditures 14.6 15.1 15.9 15.1 13.3 15.0 15.8 
Local government        
 Overall balance 0.8 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.3 – 
 Revenues  15.4 15.0 15.2 14.6 14.2 13.9 – 
  incl. transfers 1.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.4 – 
 Expenditures 14.6 15.2 15.7 15.0 14.0 13.6 – 
Extra-budgetary funds*  
 Overall balance 1.4 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 – 
 Revenues  8.3 8.0 8.8 8.6 8.1 8.3 – 
  incl. transfers 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 2.3 – 
 Expenditures 6.8 7.7 9.0 8.4 7.7 8.0 – 
* Extra-budgetary funds refer to pensions, employment, social insurance and medical 
insurance funds. 
Sources: IMF Article IV consultation documents (2006), Rosstat, Troika Dialog and DB 
Research. 
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At his 26 April 2007 (and presumably last) Annual Address to the 
State Duma, President Putin unveiled a package of additional pre-electoral 
spending estimated at RUB 650 billion, implying (if fully executed) further 
fiscal expenditures worth around 2% of GDP, spread over 2007–09. This 
package includes social measures (housing and pensions), the capitalisation 
of a new Russian Development Bank and the creation of off-budget 
innovation and economic diversification funds (the largest of which is the 
Nanotechnology Corporation).66 Later in 2007, another fiscal package worth 
RUB 300 billion was announced to support the 2014 Winter Olympics in 
Sochi (effectively a regional development programme for the whole region, 
Krasnodar Krai). 
The fiscal framework has been further strengthened by decisions 
taken in April 2007.67 The Russian Oil Stabilisation Fund (StabFund), 
having been established in 2003 and remained the main fiscal restraint 
framework in Russia, was divided in February 2008 into a fiscal 
stabilisation and an investment component. The fiscal stabilisation part will 
perform the current StabFund functions (i.e. to shelter fiscal policy from 
swings in oil prices) and will be fixed at 10% of GDP, while the investment 
component is expected to have some functions akin to a sovereign wealth 
                                                 
66 The capitalisation funds of the development institutions where duly transferred 
in December 2007, in the usual Russian end-of-year dash to spend budgetary 
allocations. This particular operation also helped to increase the liquidity of the 
Russian banking system, in the wake of the summer 2007 episode of financial 
instability. 
67 Revenues used to accrue to the Russian Oil Stabilisation Fund (or StabFund) 
from oil exports and production taxes when prices rose above $20 per barrel, but 
the threshold was raised to $27 after January 2006, and was replaced in February 
2008 by fixed tranfers. The StabFund also experienced other significant changes 
during 2006: its assets were converted from rubles into hard currencies (at the end 
of 2006, it was composed of $39.4 billion, €30.8 billion and £4.6 billion) and some of 
its assets can now be invested in triple-A bonds from OECD countries. To give an 
example of the possible pay-off from such a diversified investment strategy, 
simulations by the author show the StabFund growing from the current 11% of 
GDP to almost 18% in 2030, in a low return scenario (using the long-term returns of 
US Treasuries as a benchmark), and to almost 200% of GDP in the high return 
scenario (using the average long-term price premium of stocks over Treasuries). As 
a comparison, the Norway Oil Fund, which has a similar investment strategy, 
reached 90% of GDP in 2006. 
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fund.68 The StabFund had reached almost $150 billion in accumulated 
assets by late December 2007 (worth over 11% of GDP). 
A medium-term expenditure framework was also formally 
introduced by the April 2007 reforms (albeit through a simple change in the 
budget code law, making it a somewhat weaker sort of ‘fiscal rule’). This 
three-year budgetary framework additionally encompasses separate oil and 
non-oil budgetary systems (to be phased in progressively). These changes 
include a cap on the transfers from the oil to the non-oil budget, and a limit 
for the non-oil deficit (see Box 2.2). Moreover, in a gradual move towards 
performance budgeting, the government has decided to start including 
performance indicators that will cover an estimated 70% of the expenditure 
in the federal budget. This last change is especially relevant given the 
traditionally low effectiveness of public spending in Russia, which is even 
more worrying given the ongoing election-related fiscal expansion.  
This strengthening of the fiscal framework can be seen as an 
indication that the policy (and political) debate within the Russian 
government about a more ‘liberal’ use of the revenues from the energy 
sector has been won by the fiscally conservative Ministry of Finance, 
against the more spendthrift MEDT. (This is also reflected in the September 
2007 promotion of Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin to Deputy Prime 
Minister.) 
In any case, the 2006 general government budget would still have 
been balanced at an oil price of $32 per barrel. Despite further fiscal 
relaxation in 2007, it would be balanced at a price of $40 per barrel (or 
roughly 40% of the oil price in late December 2007). This suggests that 
Russia currently taxes and saves a large proportion of its terms-of-trade 
gains, even under relatively conservative oil price assumptions. 
Consequently, there might still be scope for fiscal stimuli (through 
increased spending or tax cuts) in the medium term.  
 
                                                 
68 In 2005, Russia introduced a separate investment fund, which was managed by 
the MEDT, but was transferred to the Ministry for Regional Development in the 
September 2007 cabinet reshuffle. This investment fund has relatively small 
amounts allocated to it (around $2 billion) and will only consider co-financing 
projects led by private investment in certain specific priority areas, including 
infrastructure (in this sense, it is similar to a fund for the co-financing of public–
private partnerships, PPPs). 
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Box 2.2 Changes in the fiscal framework in 2007 
Starting from 2008, all Russian budget revenues will be divided into ‘oil’ and 
‘non-oil’ budgets. Oil revenues will include not only the mineral extraction tax 
and export duties on crude oil (the taxes that currently generate the StabFund 
revenues) but also tax proceeds related to oil products and, crucially, natural 
gas. The transfers from the oil to the non-oil budget will be capped (at 3.7% of 
GDP, a limit to be reached by 2011), while a binding limit for the non-oil budget 
deficit will be introduced (set at 4.7% of GDP by 2011). 
From 1 February 2008 onwards, the StabFund was divided into a reserve 
fund, akin to the current StabFund and a ‘fund for future generations’ (also 
known as the ‘welfare fund’). The former will be fixed at 10% of GDP, and funds 
in excess of this amount will be transferred to the latter. According to President 
Putin’s April 2007 address to the State Duma, the welfare fund (the assets of 
which are expected to be invested using a more activist approach than those of 
the StabFund) are also to be used to finance any shortfall in the pensions system. 
In addition, the welfare fund is to provide resources for projects to be financed 
by ‘development institutions’ such as the ‘venture fund’ and the Development 
Bank. The precise nature of the potential uses and the investment rules for the 
future welfare fund are still under discussion. 
 
The assumption described above that funds from natural resources 
should be accumulated in a fund until the non-renewable resource is 
exhausted only holds if a country does not start with a less than optimal 
level of capital stock, if there are no positive externalities of public spending 
on productivity and if no intergenerational equity considerations are taken 
into account. It is arguable whether either of these conditions applies in 
Russia, and thus there may be a stronger rationale for the current usage of 
oil/gas revenues, for instance on infrastructure projects. 
2.2.2 The monetary and exchange-rate policy frameworks and the 
financial system 
Russia has experienced a somewhat slow disinflation process. Until 2006, 
inflation was stubbornly stuck at the low double-digit levels for several 
years (see Figure 1.5 in section 1.4.2 above). In 2006, however, CPI inflation 
fell below two digits, reaching 9%69 (before jumping back to 11.9% in 2007).  
                                                 
69 This inflation rate is below the CIS and African 2006 averages (9.6% and 9.9%, 
respectively) and very close to the fuel exporters’ average inflation (8.6%) in 2006. 
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Equally, for the first time, the CBR attained the inflation target it had set at 
the beginning of 2006 (for the targets in previous years, see Table 2.2). The 
CBR also undershot its own REER appreciation target, which reached 7.7% 
in 2006 (against a target of 9%, and compared with the 10% appreciation 
observed in 2005). Real exchange rate appreciation had brought the ruble 
significantly above its 1998 level by 2006 (see Figure 1.6 in section 1.4.3). 
Table 2.2 Stated objectives and targets of the CBR 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
M2 aggregate 
growth rates 
as an inter-
mediate 
target: 18-26% 
growth 
M2 aggregate 
growth rates 
as an inter-
mediate 
target: 21-25% 
growth 
M2 aggregate 
growth rates 
as an inter-
mediate 
target: 27-34% 
growth 
M2 aggregate 
growth rates 
as an inter-
mediate 
target: 22-28% 
growth 
M2 aggregate 
growth rates 
as an inter-
mediate 
target: 20-26% 
growth 
M2 aggregate 
growth rates 
as an inter-
mediate 
target: 19-25% 
growth 
Reduction of 
the inflation 
rate to 30% 
Reduction of 
the inflation 
rate to 18% 
 
Reduction of 
the inflation 
rate to 12-14% 
a year 
Reduction of 
inflation to 
12-14% a year 
range (core 
inflation 
concept 
introduced) 
Reduction of 
inflation to 
10-12% (core 
inflation 
should be 
kept within 
the 8.0-8.5% 
range) 
Reduction of 
inflation to 8-
10% (or 7-8% 
core 
inflation), to 
6.5-8.5% in 
2005 and to 
5.5-7.5% in 
2006 
GDP growth:  
–1% to –3% 
GDP fall 
GDP growth: 
1.5% 
GDP growth:  
4-5% 
GDP growth:  
3.5-4.5% 
GDP growth: 
3.5-4.5% 
GDP growth: 
3.5-4.5% 
Exchange 
rate: in 1999 
the exchange 
rate was not a 
formal 
monetary 
policy target 
 
Exchange 
rate: in 2000 
the exchange 
rate was not a 
formal 
monetary 
policy target 
 
Exchange 
rate: in 2001 
the exchange 
rate was not a 
formal 
monetary 
policy target 
Exchange 
rate: nominal 
exchange rate 
targeting? 
Exchange 
rate: “The 
Bank of 
Russia 
believes that 
the ruble’s 
REER may 
safely rise by 
4% to 6% in 
2003.” 
Exchange 
rate: “[T]he 
REER of the 
ruble may rise 
by 3%-5%. 
The Bank of 
Russia will try 
to stop it from 
rising by 
more than 
7%.” 
Source: Esanov, Merkl & Vinhas de Souza (2005). 
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Institutional and structural factors have been constraining the 
effectiveness of monetary sterilisation. Only a limited set of sterilisation 
instruments is available to the CBR: after the domestic default of 1998, open 
market operations with government securities and CBR bonds were not 
carried out until 2003, owing to the sheer lack of marketable government 
securities in the CBR portfolio. In addition, the relatively shallow domestic 
financial market, with a large share of state-owned banks (see Box 2.3) 
operating under permanent excess liquidity, restricts the effectiveness of a 
monetary policy based on interest rates (Vinhas de Souza, 2006).  
 
Box 2.3 The Russian banking system 
Russia currently has 1,135 institutions authorised to perform banking operations 
(1,091 of which are banks, and of those 60 are foreign-owned or participated), 
down from 2,457 at the end of 1994. Among these, 909 banks or approximately 
84% of the total (accounting for nearly 99% of all household deposits) were 
accepted into the deposit insurance scheme introduced in 2003, which was used 
to eliminate some of the undercapitalised banks that had previously plagued the 
Russian banking system.  
The banking sector in Russia continues to be dominated by the state: the 
share of state-owned banks in the total banking sector assets at the end of 2005 
was about 38%. The two largest banks, Sberbank (of which the CBR, another 
Gosbank offspring, is the major shareholder and which was effectively used as a 
policy tool by the CBR in the 1994–95, 1998 and 2007 crises) and Vneshtorgbank 
(VTB),† increased their market share in 2005 (to about 29% and 6% of the assets, 
respectively). So too did the rest of the state banks (to 3.5%, of which over 2% is 
accounted for by the Bank of Moscow, controlled by the Moscow city 
government). In addition, there are banks controlled by state-controlled 
corporations, the largest being Gazprombank with 5% of the sector’s assets, and 
banks in which the state holds a non-controlling minority stake. Thus, estimates 
show that over 50% of the banking sector’s assets are controlled directly or 
indirectly by the Russian state. It is usually assumed that state-controlled banks 
may not be as sensitive to interest rate changes as private ones, thereby 
hindering a monetary policy based on interest rates.  
The counterpart of this large share of state control of the banking system 
is the relatively low share of foreign participation, which stood at around 16% of 
total assets in mid-2007,†† in spite of the formal absence of limits on foreign 
ownership in the banking sector.†††  
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Box 2.3, cont. 
Notwithstanding the dominant role of the state, no reduction of state ownership 
in the banking sector is foreseen in the Strategy for Banking Sector Development 
2004–08, which was drawn up jointly by the Russian government and the CBR.  
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
† As an indication of the willingness of the Russian state to consider minority private 
ownership even in such state bulwarks as Gazprom (whose ring-fenced limits to foreign 
ownership were removed in December 2005) and Rosneft (whose successful IPO occurred 
in 2006, attracting $10.6 billion), the IPO of some of Sberbank’s capital was closed in 
February 2007, attracting around $9 billion in investment. VTB’s own IPO happened in 
May 2007 and attracted a similar amount of money. 
†† This share is indeed low if one compares it with the new EU member states. In 
Bulgaria, 80% of the assets of the banking system are foreign-owned, while the share is 
95% in the Czech Republic, 98% in Estonia, 63% in Hungary, 68% in Latvia, 87% in 
Lithuania, 70% in Poland, 55% in Romania, 83% in Slovakia and 26% in Slovenia. But 
Russia’s share is actually not that low by the standards of comparably large EU economies (7% in 
Germany and 15% in France) and other large emerging economies (2% in China, 8% in India 
and 27% in Brazil). 
††† This policy is contrary to the insurance sector, where there is a quota for foreign 
participation currently set at 25%, which is expected to be lifted to 50% after accession to 
the World Trade Organisation. In any case, the foreign share of this sector is below that of 
banking. 
 
Since the collapse of the sliding peg exchange-rate regime in 1998, the 
CBR has followed a managed exchange-rate regime, with parallel and 
incompatible inflation and exchange rate targets (with the exchange rate 
target usually considered to take precedence over the inflation target when 
inconsistencies arise). The ruble is currently pegged to a US dollar–euro 
basket. (In February 2005, the CBR started targeting a currency basket of 
initially 90% US dollars and 10% euros, with the CBR progressively 
increasing the euro share to reflect the EU’s share in Russia’s foreign trade; 
by February 2007, the euro share had reached 45%.) 
So far, the CBR has been forced to follow a relatively accommodative 
monetary policy. The current external environment in Russia is a 
particularly challenging one for a central bank with such potentially 
inconsistent targets and limited tools at its disposal. The persistent and 
large current account surplus causes upward pressure on the exchange 
rate, which the CBR tries to prevent, to avoid missing its exchange rate 
appreciation target and thereby undermining the competitiveness of the 
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non-natural resources sector. This, however, implies that the CBR has to 
buy up the large excess of dollars by selling rubles, with the consequence of 
permanent, excessive ruble liquidity on the domestic market, and hence 
potential inflationary pressures. Hard currency reserves at the CBR reached 
over $500 billion by late March 200870 (from around $182 billion in 2005) or 
the equivalent value of almost 18 months of imports. This figure makes 
Russia the third largest holder of hard currency reserves on the planet 
(after China and Japan). 
Part of this expansion has been financed by the accumulation of 
foreign private debt. The official external debt-to-GDP ratio decreased further 
in 2006, from around 12% in 2005 to 4.7% (it had escalated to around 80% of 
GDP after the 1998 crisis), after a new round of debt pre-payment to the 
Paris Club in 2006, worth $22 billion (using StabFund assets), which 
followed the 2005 debt redemptions with the IMF and the Paris Club. Yet 
external debt has recently increased, owing to the strong accumulation of 
private and quasi-private (i.e. companies with state participation such as 
Gazprom, Rosneft, Sberbank and VTB) foreign debt: in 2006, it rose by over 
20%, reaching $310 billion or almost 30% of GDP. By the end 2007, Russia’s 
total external debt had reached almost $460 billion (a mere 10% of which is 
government debt).  
This financial development was bolstered by the 2003 adoption of a 
law on the insurance of deposits (not implemented until 2005). This law is 
expected to promote more transparency in bank ownership, and improve 
banks’ liquidity, solvency and capital adequacy as well as discipline in 
banking operations. Financial development is further supported by the 
CBR’s shift of its supervisory procedures from compliance-based to risk-
based supervision (shored up by a large and very successful TACIS71 and 
                                                 
70 In early 2007, Russia’s currency reserves were roughly allocated as follows: 50% 
in US dollars, 40% in euros, 9% in British pounds sterling and 1% in Japanese yen.  
71 TACIS stands for Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States. It 
was the original EU assistance facility to support reform and development in the 
CIS countries (plus Mongolia), launched in 1991. Through it, the EU became one of 
the largest donors in the region (beyond TACIS, the EU has several support and 
technical assistance programmes in the region, from cross-border cooperation 
funds and European Investment Bank (EIB) external lending mandates to macro-
financial assistance programmes, which are external adjustment packages 
managed by ECFIN that are similar to those of the IMF). With the end of transition 
and the 2004–07 EU enlargements, TACIS was replaced in 2007 by the more 
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European Central Bank technical assistance programme) and by the 
progressive introduction of international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) and Basel-compatible capital adequacy ratios.  
Another feature of the ongoing financial deepening in Russia is the 
expansion of its equity market. The equity market in Russia grew in value 
from $325 billion in early 2005 to over $1 trillion by the end of 2006, or from 
53% to over 100% of GDP (far above the EU’s average), while in 2002, the 
total capitalisation of the equity market in Russia had stood at a mere 25% 
of GDP.  
A very substantial part of this boost is the result of the increase in the 
market value of energy-sector companies and the stock market flotation of 
state-owned ones. For instance, Gazprom increased its market valuation 
between mid-2005 and the first quarter of 2006 from $70 billion to $300 
billion. During 2006–07, Russia was one of the best-performing stock 
markets in the world (see Figure 2.3).72 
Since the full liberalisation of the capital account (which took place 
ahead of schedule on 1 July 2006),73 the medium-term objective of the CBR 
has been the introduction of a floating exchange-rate-cum-inflation-
targeting regime, which will free the monetary authority from 
considerations about the exchange rate. The recent reduction in the current 
account surplus, if continued, may imply a reduction of the structural 
excess liquidity, hence making monetary policy tools (including the CBR’s 
refinancing of interest rates) more effective and reducing the dangers 
related to REER appreciation, such as a loss in competitiveness. 
                                                                                                                            
flexible and larger European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 
the financial tool of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
72 There are 11 Russian stock exchanges in total: the Russian Trading System (RTS) 
and the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), both in Moscow, plus 9 
regional ones. A large share of stock trading is done away from the floors of the 
stock exchanges, however, through over-the-counter operations (see Vinhas de 
Souza, 2004b). 
73 Among other indications of the fuller financial integration of Russia into global 
financial markets, since early 2007 it has been possible to trade on US dollar/ruble 
futures, and Euroclear, an organisation that clears foreign exchange transactions, 
has begun accepting the ruble as a settlement currency on international 
transactions. 
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Figure 2.3 Russian Trading System stock index 
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The 2007 CBR inflation target of 8% was missed, as inflation is 
estimated to have reached almost 12%, partially reflecting a worldwide 
commodities-driven price increase that has similarly affected several 
emerging markets, but the CBR has kept its 2008 target of 8.5%. 
In order to contain the instability unleashed in financial markets by 
the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the US, the CBR took 
various measures during August 2007, mirroring the actions of other 
central banks worldwide, including the European Central Bank and the 
Federal Reserve. These included the injection of a record RUB 1 trillion 
(over $40 billion) through repo operations during the second half of August 
2007 in the banking system. Russia’s large trade and current account 
surpluses make any significant liquidity provision operations by the CBR 
very rare. The CBR refinancing rate also went below the overnight money 
market rates in August (at 6% and 10%, respectively), reversing the usual 
spread between them. The CBR additionally sold around $5.5 billion in the 
domestic markets to deal with a lack of liquidity in US dollars. Those 
resources were taken from its hard currency reserves, as foreign investors 
repatriated some short-term capital from Russia in August (the outflow is 
estimated at around $5.6 billion). This caused a temporary break in the 
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long-term appreciation trend of the ruble. The return of capital inflows by 
October and the usual injection of liquidity through budgetary execution in 
December 2007 provided further liquidity to the banking system. 
As of March 2008, there are no significant indications that this market 
instability will have long-term effects in Russia (the ‘decoupling’ as 
discussed in relation to the experience of other emerging markets). Most of 
the likely channels of transmission of the instability are of a microeconomic 
character, and not macroeconomic as in 1998, given the much-improved 
macroeconomic situation and prospects of Russia. Concerning the micro 
channels, the Russian companies with the largest external liabilities are 
‘naturally hedged’ (i.e. they have income flows in hard currency, as most 
are exporters of natural resources), which limits their vulnerability.  
The major exceptions to this are banks, which have been responsible 
for a large share (perhaps as high as 50%) of the significant accumulation of 
private and quasi-private external liabilities in the last few years. Even so, 
there are mitigating factors in their case: 
1) the fact that the largest Russian banks are majority state-owned. 
Indeed, the banks that seemed to face liquidity problems in August–
September 2007 were a few private ones, a result similar to the 
estimations in Vinhas de Souza (2006); and  
2) the limited exposure of Russian financial institutions to mortgage-
backed securities, the main financial instruments behind the crisis. 
The CBR has followed a measured route towards a more flexible 
exchange rate and a monetary policy centred on the slow reduction of 
inflation, but it also has responsibilities towards the stability of the financial 
system. The initial indications are that it reacted effectively to the financial 
instability episode initiated in August 2007, but perhaps at the cost of re-
stoking inflation. In any case, it is likely that the most pressing challenge for 
monetary policy (and for economic policy in Russia) in the medium term is 
a switch in the external position, with the reduction and eventual 
disappearance of the current account surplus (forecast by ECFIN to occur 
as early as 2009). These changes would leave the country vulnerable to the 
run down of hard currency reserves and StabFund assets and to 
developments in capital inflows, the latter of which are considered in the 
next section. 
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2.3 Foreign direct investment74 
As indicated above, until recently Russia has managed to grow with 
comparatively little investment. Russia has traditionally underperformed 
against other Eastern European and CIS countries in terms of FDI 
attraction. This situation has changed, with the share of net FDI in GDP 
reaching a value similar to that of other large emerging economies (such as 
China). The main issue, however, is the extent to which this surge in FDI 
will be short-lived or whether it will be sustained over time. This section 
describes the recent trends in terms of Russia’s FDI inflows and outflows, 
the most important investors and the main sectors of destination. 
2.3.1 Recent FDI performance 
Prior to 2006, per capita FDI into Russia had been very disappointing, with 
Russia having significantly underperformed the CIS average since the early 
1990s (Figure 2.4, top panel). In 2006, this situation changed abruptly, as net 
FDI per capita jumped above the 2005 level by almost 40 times. 
This increase reflected a major jump in growth in total FDI inflows 
(see Figure 2.4, bottom panel). FDI into Russia had risen by almost 8.3 times 
since 2002, reaching around $29 billion in 2006,75 or around 3.2% of GDP 
(more than three times its 2002 GDP share). Correspondingly, the share of  
 
                                                 
74 This section is based on Vinhas de Souza (2008). 
75 The FDI series presented by the CBR and Rosstat are not always consistent (for 
instance, in 2006, the CBR indicated a total FDI figure of $28.7 billion, while Rosstat 
put it at $31.1 billion), owing to methodological differences. CBR data are on a 
balance-of-payments basis, differentiating between residents and non-residents 
and adjusting for exchange rate movements. Rosstat data are survey-based and 
without adjustment for the ruble appreciation. The data above come from the CBR. 
On the other hand, as Rosstat statistics are the only ones that can provide a 
breakdown by country of origin and sector of investment, they are used in Tables 
2.3 and 2.4. Rosstat’s longer foreign investment series classifies as “foreign 
investment” an aggregate of FDI, portfolio investment and “other investments” 
(this last item, in Rosstat’s definition, includes “trade and other credits”, which 
have grown from 40% of all foreign investment in 2000 to almost 76% in 2007). 
Rosstat FDI and portfolio investment statistics are significantly lower than the 
statistics given by the CBR. Also, Rosstat FDI data with a sector/country 
breakdown were only available to this author for 2006-07. 
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Russia in total FDI in the CIS, which had fallen during most of the 1990s, 
had escalated from under than 40% in 2002 to almost 70% in 2006 (which is 
still less than Russia’s current share of the CIS aggregate GDP, at around 
76%).  
Figure 2.4 FDI in Russia and the CIS ($) 
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The real change observed in 2006 was the sudden reversal of net FDI 
totals: net FDI and portfolio investment into Russia jumped from $-0.7 
billion in 2005 to $+20.5 billion in 2006 (see Figure 2.5) or around 2.2% of 
GDP (at the same time, the item ‘net errors and omissions’ swings from 
$-8.8 billion to $1.1 billion). This is a very significant reversal of the 
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traditional capital flight observed out of Russia, but at this stage, one 
cannot really speak of a sustained trend.76 
Figure 2.5 Net FDI/portfolio and net total inflows ($ billion) 
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This trend seems to have continued in 2007, albeit not necessarily at 
the same scale (Figure 2.5).77 Estimates by the CBR indicate that total FDI 
reached around $53 billion during 2007, while net FDI was around $7 
billion. The balance of payments’ surplus of the capital and financial 
account reached over $60 billion during the year. This increase in total 
inflows is partially explained by the launch of a number of large IPOs in the 
first half of 2007 (notably the IPOs of the two largest state-owned banks, 
Sberbank and VTB, which attracted around $9 billion each) and by the 
auction of the remaining assets of Yukos. The volume of capital inflows 
was forecast to abate during the remainder of 2007 even before the market 
                                                 
76 According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2006), 
Russia had the third largest stock of outward FDI among emerging economies. Of 
course, outward FDI is not just ‘capital flight’; it also reflects the (positive) 
increased internationalisation of an economy. 
77 UNCTAD (2007b) asserts that Russia is now the fourth most attractive prospective 
destination for FDI in the world. 
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turbulence of August 2007 (which seemingly had a very limited impact on 
capital inflows into Russia), because of more limited IPO-related activities, 
but the totals accumulated during the first nine months of 2007 were 
nonetheless very significant.  
Total private sector inflows and outflows (i.e. including credit and 
loans) into Russia have systematically grown since 2000, with inflows 
surpassing outflows by 2003 (the positive balance by 2006 was almost $41 
billion, for total inflows of over $105 billion). This increase is one of the 
factors behind the ongoing expansion in domestic investment, which is to 
some extent driven by state-controlled companies, and has as a counterpart 
the increase in foreign exposure of private and quasi-private companies. 
Throughout this period, Russian outward FDI and portfolio investment 
rose continually, from $3 billion in 2001 to almost $20 billion in 2006, as 
major Russian companies internationalised their operations (see Box 2.4). 
 
 
Box 2.4 Russian transnational corporations 
Russia is more and more a source of FDI, as discussed above (see Table B2.4a – 
using UNCTAD data, Russia held third place in terms of outward FDI stock in 
2005, with $123 billion). This development is not necessarily negative, as a 
capital outflow is not always a sign of capital flight. Rather, it may show the 
growing integration of Russia into the world economy, as its companies expand 
abroad. 
Table B2.4a Russian outgoing capital flows ($ billion) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001–06 
Total Russian 
FDI portfolio 
abroad 
3.7 2.7 3.5 9.7 13.9 14.3 19.8 67.7 
Sector outflows 19.1 11.8 19.8 25.4 40.9 60.2 64.8 241.9 
Source: CBR. 
Russia’s largest companies (mostly in the natural resource sectors, but 
also in the financial and higher technological areas) compare favourably with 
the larger firms from other emerging markets (see Table B2.4b) and have led 
this process. The increased integration of Russian firms into the global economy 
is further represented by the growing number of IPOs in international financial 
centres (Severstal and Sintronics) and international mergers (for instance, the 
2006 merger between the Swiss company Glencore and SuAl). 
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Box 2.4, cont. 
Table B2.4b Ranking of Russian transnational corporations among CIS and south-
eastern European transnational corporations, by foreign assets (2004) 
Name 
 
 
Rank 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
Assets 
abroad 
($ million) 
Sales 
abroad  
($ million) 
Employment 
abroad 
Gazprom 1 Petroleum & natural  
  gas 
– 24,536 – 
Lukoil 2 Petroleum & natural  
  gas 
7,792 26,408 13,929 
Norilsk 3 Mining & quarrying 1,413 5,968 1,772 
Novoship  
  Co. 
4 Transport 1,296 350 55 
Rusal 6 Metal & metal parts 743 4,412 5,490 
OMZ 7 Motor vehicles 347 271 8,484 
Severstal 9 Metal & metal parts 174 3,954 7,098 
Mechel 10 Metal & metal parts 120 2,203 10,689 
Source: UNCTAD. 
It is difficult to obtain precise information about the country and sector 
distribution of outgoing Russian FDI, but 5% of the Russian FDI in 2003–05 was 
invested in other CIS countries. Table B2.4c provides a list of recent, large 
foreign investments undertaken by Russian firms. 
Table B2.4c Examples of large outgoing FDI by Russian transnational corporations 
 in 2006–07 
Investor Industry Company Share 
acquired 
(%) 
Value of 
deal ($ 
million) 
Evraz Steel Oregon Steel Mills (US) 100 2,300 
VTB AeroSpace EADS (France/ 
 Germany) 
5 1,170 
NLMK Steel Steel Invest (Finland) 50 805 
Vimpelcom Mobile telecom Armentel (Armenia) 90 436 
Norilsk Nickel Metals Nickel business of OM 
Group (US) 
100 408 
Interros Energy US Plug Power (US) 35 241 
Rusal Construction Strabag SE (Austria) 30 1,500 
AirBridge Airline Malev (Hungary) 100 210 
Rusal Metals Alscon (Nigeria) 77.50 n.d. 
Note:: n.d. refers to not disclosed. 
Sources: Oxford Analytica, Intelli News and compilations by the author. 
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2.3.2 Origins of FDI inflows 
Who is behind this sudden increase in investment? Although it is difficult 
to ascertain the sources precisely, it seems likely that a very significant 
share of both the investment inflows into Russia and the recent increase is 
Russian capital returning to the country through tax havens for tax 
‘optimisation’ purposes. One can see that clearly in Table 2.3, which shows 
the most important sources of investment inflows into Russia by country.  
Table 2.3 Sources of investment into Russia 
  1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 3Q 2007 
UK 6 6 12 16 17 16 13 24 
Netherlands 3 11 6 6 13 17 12 20 
Cyprus 1 13 12 14 14 10 18 14 
Luxembourg 0 2 6 8 21 26 11 9 
France 4 7 6 13 6 3 6 5 
Germany 10 13 20 15 4 6 9 4 
Virgin Islands 
   (UK) 
1 1 7 5 2 2 4 2 
Switzerland 15 7 7 4 4 4 4 9 
US 28 15 6 4 5 3 3 2 
Others 33 25 19 17 15 15 28 23 
Sources: Rosstat and author’s own calculations. 
 
As much as 18% of all investment inflows in 2006 and 14% in the first 
half of 2007 originated in Cyprus, one of the smallest EU member states.78 
Nearly one-third of the total 2006 investment and over a quarter during the 
first nine months of 2007 (and almost 35% of the total FDI stock by that 
date) originated in EU member states or EU-linked territories with similar 
                                                 
78 The share of Cyprus in the FDI stock in September 2007 was 31%. Cross-checking 
Rosstat data with data from the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) lends supports to 
the notion that this is Russian capital ‘round-tripping’. More specifically, the CBC 
only classifies as ‘Cypriot’ investment capital from companies and individuals 
satisfying some residence criteria, and the CBC data are equivalent to a mere 7.2% 
of the inflow that Rosstat labelled as Cypriot in 2005 (the average for 2002–05 was 
under 3.5%). 
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conditions for the taxation of capital (Cyprus, Luxembourg79 and the UK 
Virgin Islands). In any case, the result is a consistently very high share of 
investment going into Russia from EU countries and territories: by 
September 2007, over 80% of investment inflows (and a similar figure for 
the stock) was from the eight most important EU-based investors.80 
2.3.3 Sectoral distribution of investment inflows 
Which sectors of the Russian economy attract the most investment flows? 
As shown in Table 2.4, the service sectors have consistently been the largest 
receivers of foreign investment, with between 50% and nearly 60% of the 
total investment inflows during 2003–07. Among the industrial sectors, the 
natural resource sectors and manufacturing attract roughly comparable 
amounts of investment. The investment in the energy sector fell sharply in 
2005 following the Yukos affair. It has since partially recovered (in 2006 and 
2007). The weight of foreign investment in energy in total foreign 
investment is close to the weight of the energy sector in Russia’s GDP. This 
is also the case for foreign investment into manufacturing, which broadly 
reflects the GDP share of the manufacturing sector. 
The share of the energy sector is much larger in FDI alone (i.e. 
without portfolio and ‘other investments’). Cumulated FDI in the energy 
sector in September 2007 represented one-third of all FDI, slightly under 
that of the services sector. Also, the share of the energy sector in the FDI 
inflows in the period January–September 2007 was nearly two-thirds of the 
total (64%). That being said, the limitations of the Rosstat FDI data should 
be stressed once again. 
Available statistics do not fully allow the geographical origin of the 
investment inflows to be cross-referenced with their sectoral destination. 
Nevertheless, in almost all sectors of the Russian economy, investment 
stemming from the EU member states seems to account for the largest 
share of the FDI total. 
 
                                                 
79 Luxembourg also functions as a hub for FDI flows into the euro area, with a 
significant share of the FDI flowing into it going through Luxembourg-based 
‘special purposes entities’ used for financial intermediation. 
80 Actually, when the Eurostat data on total EU FDI into Russia are cross-checked 
with the Russian series of total received FDI, EU FDI is more than 100% of the total 
FDI into Russia in some years. 
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Table 2.4 Sectoral distributions of FDI inflows into Russia, 2005–07 (%) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 3Q2007 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 
Mining and quarrying 19.3 24.5 11.2 16.6 17.3 
including      
mining and quarrying of  
energy-producing products 
17.3 21.6 9.6 14.1 16 
mining and quarrying, except 
energy- producing products 
2 2.9 1.6 2.5 1.3 
Manufacturing 22 25.3 33.5 27.5 24.6 
of which      
manufacture of food products 3.4 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.5 
manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 
1.2 1.9 2.7 2.8 1.2 
manufacture of  metals and 
fabricated metal products 
10.3 12.6 6.4 6.8 12.6 
manufacture of transport 
equipment 
0.7 2.1 1.8 2.6 0.9 
manufacture of coke and mineral 
oil 
0.6 0.2 15.1 7.2 3.8 
Services 58.2 49.9 55.1 55.3 57.8 
construction 0.3 0.6 0.4 1.3 1.2 
wholesale, retail, repair activities 36.1 32.9 38.2 23.7 42.3 
 transport and communication 3.8 5 7.2 9.6 6.5 
of which      
communication 2.3 3.4 6.1 8.5 2.9 
 financial intermediation 2.6 2.5 3.4 8.5 2.4 
Sources: Rosstat and author’s own calculations. 
To ensure that the recent increase in FDI inflows – for which the EU is 
largely responsible – becomes a sustainable long-term trend, Russia still has 
to improve the overall investment climate in the country along with the 
legal framework for FDI. This subject is the focus of the next section. 
2.3.4 Reforms in FDI legislation 
The reform of the energy sector in Russia is tightly bound with the wider 
question of the legal framework for FDI. This legal framework for FDI in 
Russia is still being developed in several different directions, and not 
necessarily towards practices that are more restrictive. 
70 | VINHAS DE SOUZA 
 
The reforms have included the introduction of laws for research 
zones (technoparks) and industrial special economic zones (SEZs, after the 
22 June 2005 federal Law on Special Economic Zones in the Russian 
Federation)81 and for public–private partnerships,82 after the 21 June 2005 
federal Law on Concessions). These are potentially useful instruments for 
regional development and for attracting foreign investment into certain 
areas (for instance, infrastructure) that the government does not intend to 
privatise, if used in an exceptional and means-tested manner, and made 
strictly compatible with any international legal obligations undertaken by 
Russia (including accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)). 
Nevertheless, arguably the main outstanding questions related to FDI are 
investment in strategic sectors and the Subsoil Law. 
In July 2007, the Russian government submitted to the State Duma 
the draft law on the rules for foreign investment in enterprises having 
strategic importance for the national security of the Russian Federation. 
This legislation has been in preparation since the summer of 2005. It 
comprises the Law on Strategic Enterprises and amendments to the Subsoil 
Law (the latter was first submitted to the Duma in 2005; it is still pending a 
first reading there). The draft states that in sectors deemed “strategic” 
(currently 39, albeit many of these are just sub-sectors of an industry),83 
foreign acquisition of more than 50% of the capital would require 
                                                 
81 Technoparks were set up in Zelenograd, Tomsk, St Petersburg and Dubna, while 
industrial SEZs were approved for the Elabyga and Lipetsk regions. Resident 
companies in these SEZs are exempted from taxes on property and land, and from 
VAT and customs duties on imported equipment. Companies in industrial SEZs 
pay lower taxes on profits and on R&D, while those in technoparks pay half of the 
single social tax. The local and federal budgets also finance the building of 
infrastructure in the zones. In addition, several SEZs for tourism and recreational 
purposes were approved. A SEZ existed before this legislation in the Kaliningrad 
region. 
82 Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are justified more in terms of economic 
efficiency than for increasing a government’s fiscal envelope. The largest example 
in Russia so far is the Western High Speed Diameter highway in St Petersburg, a 
project co-financed by the EBRD and the EIB. 
83 These sectors concern the hydro meteorological and geophysical industry, 
activities related to the use of pathogens of infectious diseases, the nuclear and 
airspace industries, the coding/cryptographic and surveillance industry, the 
military industry and the production/sales of goods and services from natural 
monopolies. 
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government authorisation (to be provided by a federal committee and 
within a maximum time limit of three months). For subsoil, an 
authorisation for foreign majority ownership would be necessary for 
deposits larger than a specific size.  
Many international observers and enterprise associations (including 
the Association of EU Businesses in Russia) support these reforms as an 
attempt to centralise and clarify the legal framework that has otherwise 
remained largely ad hoc and dispersed among different organisations and 
administrative levels in Russia. At the same time, these observers note that 
the intended legislation has shortcomings. The major one in the current 
draft is a very broad definition of activities having “strategic significance 
for Russia’s national security”. Another is a lack of clarity on the potential 
retroactive effects of the new legislation. The government draft passed the 
first of the three necessary readings before the State Duma in September 
2007, but it was withdrawn before its second reading in early November, 
apparently for more amendments, further delaying its approval process. It 
is unlikely that the approval procedures will advance before the end of the 
current transition in political power by mid-2008.84 In the meantime, from 
an investor perspective, the fact that the Russian legal framework is 
currently not stable may be an even stronger deterrent to investments than 
its relatively restrictive nature. 
On the other hand, significant progress has been observed in the 
liberalisation and reform of even some energy-related areas, such as the 
electricity sector (see Box 2.5). In any case, the gas sector (the subject of the 
next section) undeniably remains mostly unreformed. 85 
                                                 
84 In fact, another draft of the law was submitted in March 2008 to the Duma, 
which increased the list of strategic sectors by including media and 
telecommunications, eliminated some procedural improvements and reinforced 
the role of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the vetting decision. This draft also 
incorporated into this law the Subsoil Law, with significant lower limits for foreign 
participation in the extraction sectors (albeit excluding majority state-owned 
enterprises of these new lower limits, effectively enabling Gazprom and Rosneft to 
continue their strategy of attracting foreign minority partners). This draft law 
passed its second reading in the Duma on 21 March 2008. 
85 It should be noted that Gazprom has a minority of foreign capital, and that the 
German company E.ON Ruhrgas AG actually has a seat on its board (and 3% of its 
capital). What the Law on Gas Supply regulating Gazprom says is that the Russian 
state must own 50% plus one share of its capital. 
72 | VINHAS DE SOUZA 
 
Box 2.5 Reforms in RAO-UES 
Contrary to the gas sector, the electricity sector has undergone significant (if still 
incomplete) reform and opening-up in Russia. It is centred on one company, 
RAO-UES (a name that includes both the Russian and English acronyms of the 
company Unified Energy System). RAO-UES is the largest Russian power 
company, generating 69.4% (or 635.8 billion kWh) of the electricity and 32.4% 
(468.8 million Gcal) of the heating in Russia. It also owns 96% of the high-
voltage grids and 77% of the distribution network in the country. It is one of 
Russia’s largest companies, with almost 600,000 employees. 
The sector initially underwent significant reform with the 11 July 2001 
Law on Restructuring the Electric Power Industry of the Russian Federation, but 
the ageing infrastructure and the investment needs caused by the expansion of 
the Russian economy, sharply revealed by countrywide power shortages during 
the unusually cold winter of 2006, led to a renewed impulse for reform. 
The new structure proposed by the 2001 law progressively separated the 
company into different functional segments (the unbundling of generation and 
power transmission), aimed at privatising in a staggered fashion the potentially 
competitive areas (mainly power generation), while keeping the ‘natural 
monopoly’ ones (such as power distribution grids) in state hands. RAO-UES is 
now a holding that owns the state share in these newly created companies. 
The trunk (i.e. main) grids were integrated into a Federal Grid Company 
(100% owned by RAO-UES), while the distribution grids were transferred into 
new interregional distribution grid companies. RAO-UES also owns 100% of the 
System Operator – Centralised Dispatching Administration, which will oversee 
the liberalised wholesale and retail electricity markets. 
The energy generation assets were consolidated into two types of 
interregional companies: generation companies for the wholesale market (OGKs 
in Russian) and territorial generation companies (TGKs in Russian). OGKs 
include mainly electrical power generation plants, while TGKs include 
combined heat and power plants, which generate both electrical and thermal 
power. 
The reorganisation of the assets was mostly complete by 2006: seven 
OGKs, four interregional distribution grid companies and fourteen TGKs were 
established. That year, four TGKs and four OGKs were admitted to the Russian 
Trading System. In November 2006, OGK-5, in which RAO-UES had previously 
held an 87.67% stake, floated 14% of its stock for domestic and foreign investors, 
raising $459 million on the Russian Trading System and the Moscow Interbank 
Currency Exchange.  
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Box 2.5, cont. 
Several IPOs occurred in 2007 and more are planned. In the most recent 
one, E.ON Ruhrgas AG acquired a 47.4% stake in the wholesale generator OGK-
4 in mid-September 2007, in the largest FDI in the electricity sector ever made in 
Russia, worth around $4 billion. In another noteworthy development, in late 
August 2007, the Italian firm Enel acquired full control of OGK-5, in a $1.5 
billion investment. 
Parallel to the changes in market structure, a significant reform of the 
pricing policies was also approved: the wholesale electricity market was 
transformed into one based on regulated price/quantity contracts concluded 
between buyers and generation companies, while a limited electricity spot 
market was created. In addition, contracts with regulated prices are to be fully 
replaced by unregulated ones in 2011. This gradual liberalisation of retail 
markets is planned take place in conjunction with the wholesale market 
liberalisation (during the transition period, household electricity tariffs for the 
population will remain regulated). 
2.4 Reforms in the energy sector in Russia: Gazprom 
The energy sector in Russia holds particular interest for the EU, given the 
strategic importance of Russia as an energy supplier, especially of gas (the 
EU draws around 40% of its total gas imports from Russia, albeit this share 
has been falling). Moreover, given the size of the gas reserves (over three 
generations, at current exploration levels, as opposed to less than one for 
oil), gas has the potential to be a medium-term driver for growth in Russia 
if the sector is adequately reformed. In addition, despite the recent 
development of the state-controlled company Rosneft, the structure of the 
oil sector remains essentially private and competitive (as discussed in Box 
1.2 above).86 This section therefore focuses on the gas sector.87 
The Russian gas industry has never truly departed from the market 
structure inherited from the Soviet period. Prices are regulated, exports are 
monopolised and the domestic market is dominated by a state-controlled, 
vertically integrated monopoly, Gazprom, which frequently seems to 
behave more like an arm of the Russian state than a company (see Box 2.6). 
                                                 
86 There are, however, many outstanding questions concerning the legal 
framework for foreign participation in the exploration of oil fields in Russia. 
87 This focus in no way means that other utility monopolies in Russia (for instance, 
rail transport) are not in need of continued reform, liberalisation and opening-up. 
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As outlined in Box 1.2 above, Gazprom holds nearly one-third of the 
world’s natural gas reserves, produces around 84% of all Russia’s natural 
gas, controls almost all gas exports, supplies gas for the generation of close 
to 50% of the country’s electricity and operates its own natural gas pipeline 
grid. Gazprom is also Russia’s largest individual earner of hard currency, 
and the company’s tax payments account for almost 25% of total federal tax 
revenues.  
 
Box 2.6 (Min)GazProm – A brief history 
The joint stock company (OAO) Gazprom was established in February 1993, 
after a presidential decree of 5 November 1992 and the Resolution of the Council 
of Ministers of 17 February 1993. It is the successor of the former Soviet Union’s 
Ministry of Gas Industry (appropriately called MinGazProm). It combines 
commercial and regulatory functions. Its major shareholder is the Russian 
government, but since 1996, its shares have been traded on the Moscow stock 
exchange, and in December 2005, the limit for private ownership of its capital 
was increased to just below 50%, as a step in the process of opening the 
possibility for foreign participation in the company. 
Gazprom is the world’s largest gas-producing company and the third 
largest in terms of market capitalisation (after Exxon-Mobil and GE). It is 
responsible for around 8% of Russian GDP. It is the 100% owner of 58 
subsidiaries (as of 1 September 2002) and it participates in the capital of almost 
100 Russian and foreign companies. Together with its subsidiaries, its 
employees total nearly 300,000.  
Its major gas fields are in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region of the Yamal-
Nenetsk Autonomous Area, in Western Siberia, but it still produces about 7% of 
its gas in European Russia. In the future, the Yamal peninsula is expected to 
become its basic gas-producing region. 
Gazprom also operates the Russian United Gas Transmission System, 
which encompasses 150,000 gas main lines and branches, 253 compressor 
stations with a total installed capacity of 42.6 million kW and 22 underground 
gas storage facilities. Gas is distributed from its network to regional systems 
through 3,633 distribution stations. 
 
Through Gazprom, Russia controls gas supply routes and exports 
from the Caspian and Central Asian regions to Europe, through a series of 
bilateral deals with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan spanning 
durations of up to 25 years. Under the current agreements, Russian imports 
from the three countries would amount to 115.5 bcm. 
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Despite its size and significance, Gazprom is seriously limited by 
domestic over-regulation, and the company can be almost absurdly 
inefficient.88  
Concerning the legal framework under which it operates, Gazprom 
must supply the natural gas used to heat and power Russia’s domestic 
market at government-regulated prices (approximately $25 per thousand 
cubic metres), regardless of profitability (two-thirds of Gazprom’s profits 
come from its exports). Domestic gas prices, in spite of recent increases, 
remain below cost-recovery levels, implying significant subsides to the 
economy. Therefore, Gazprom’s virtual monopoly in the sector is 
sometimes seen as a trade-off for the below-cost supply to domestic 
Russian households and industry. Following the agreement with the EU on 
Russia’s WTO accession, however, domestic gas prices are bound to rise 
significantly. A freer market has also been established in principle in 
Russia, where Gazprom as well as oil companies and independent gas 
producers could sell gas at higher prices.89 Nevertheless, various attempts 
to split Gazprom and further liberalise the domestic gas market have failed 
so far. 
Recently, Gazprom has been trying to extend its influence throughout 
the CIS countries, raising its traditionally subsidised gas prices in the 
region to levels closer to those charged to the EU. It has used these price 
increases as a tactic to acquire full ownership of the transportation network 
towards its EU markets, by letting national energy companies in the CIS 
countries accumulate payment arrears. The acquisition of Moldovagaz, the 
gas company of Moldova, is a classic example of this strategy (see also Box 
2.7, for a description of the disputes with Western CIS and Caucasus 
countries). 
 
                                                 
88 For instance, the sector (i.e. the company) systematically comes at the bottom of 
the tables describing productivity gains in Russia, with annual productivity losses 
of almost 10% annually for the period 1997–2003. These losses are shown together 
with (related) increases of unit labour costs above 50% per year for the period 1997–
2004 (Gazprom has the highest unit labour costs of all the Russian industrial 
sectors). 
89 At the end of November 2006, a cabinet decision was taken to liberalise the 
domestic electricity price fully by 2011. Equally, domestic gas prices in Russia are 
to reach $100 for 1,000 cubic metres by 2011, in staggered increases. 
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Box 2.7 Gazprom and gas prices in the CIS 
Armenia 
The price of natural gas received by Armenia from Russia doubled to $110 per 
trillion cubic metres (tcm) from 1 April 2006. Armenia concluded an agreement 
with Gazprom to maintain this still relatively low price for natural gas in exchange 
for the transfer of ownership of parts of the country’s energy infrastructure on a 
temporary basis. Under this deal, the delivery price and terms will remain 
unchanged until 1 January 2009. The assets transferred from Armenian to Russian 
control include a thermal power plant and, reportedly, part of the new gas pipeline 
to Iran (Gazprom, through a joint venture, was granted the concession to build a 
larger, second pipeline along this route as part of the agreement). Other thermal 
power plants were transferred to Russia’s United Energy System (RAO-UES) in 
2002–03, as part of the debt-for-assets deal that settled Armenia’s $96 million debt 
to Russia. Gazprom is also expected to increase its share in the Armenian gas 
transport company ArmRosGazprom from the current 45% to 58% (a further 10% 
is already owned by Itera, a Russian energy trading company that is active 
throughout the former Soviet Union and has ties to Gazprom). Therefore, nearly all 
of Armenia’s energy infrastructure is now controlled by Russian companies. 
Belarus 
In December 2006, Gazprom indicated that it would stop gas supplies via Belarus 
(the second most important transit country to EU markets, responsible for around 
15% of Russian deliveries to the EU), unless agreement was reached on a 
substantial increase in the price paid (from the very low $46.7 per tcm) and a joint 
venture with BelTransGaz, the Belarusian state-owned gas transmission company. 
An agreement was reached just before the deadline of 31 December 2006, avoiding 
the suspension of gas supplies. The new agreement covers the period 2007–11. The 
gas price for 2007 is $100 per tcm. From 2008, this price will be linked to the prices 
charged to the EU, minus transportation costs. It will be 67% of this price in 2008, 
80% in 2009, 90% in 2010 and 100% in 2011. Transit fees for 2007 were set at $1.45, 
up from $0.75 per tcm/100 km in 2006. Gazprom also agreed on a price of $2.5 
billion for a 50% stake in a joint venture with BelTransGaz, to be paid in 
instalments over the next four years. † 
Georgia  
Russia was Georgia’s main gas supplier until 2006. In December 2006, the prices 
for Russian gas imports more than doubled from $110 to $235 per tcm. Yet the new 
South Caucasus (Baku–Tbilisi–Erzerum) gas pipeline will enable Georgia to 
diversify its gas supply: Georgia is expected to receive 250 million cubic metres 
(mcm) from Azerbaijan through this pipeline in 2007. There is an agreement to 
increase this amount by 100 mcm per year thereafter. This increase is likely to 
lower the average price for Georgian gas imports. 
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Box 2.7, cont. 
Although there is little official information on Georgia’s arrangements with 
its alternative suppliers – Azerbaijan and Turkey for 2007 – it is known that since 
the beginning of 2007 Georgia has been receiving Azerbaijani gas through an older 
pipeline, reportedly for about $120. Turkey’s gas may also play a role, if an 
agreement to sell some of one of its pipeline quotas is reached. 
Moldova 
The gas sector in Moldova is controlled by Moldovagaz, 51% of which was 
transferred to Gazprom in return for the cancellation of arrears due from the 
company (i.e. ultimately, the Moldovan government) to Gazprom. Gazprom 
requested a twofold price increase as of 1 January 2006, and after extensive 
negotiations with the Moldovan government, the import price for gas was settled 
at $110 per tcm for the first half of 2006. During the second half of that year, prices 
were again raised to $160 per tcm (average prices for 2006 were around $135). A 
transit fee of $2.5 per tcm was charged for transit services provided to Gazprom by 
Moldovagaz. In December 2006, Gazprom and Moldovagaz signed a five-year 
agreement on gas deliveries to Moldova, valid until 2011. Under this agreement, 
Gazprom raised the price to $170 per tcm. For 2007, the contracted volume has 
remained roughly constant at the 2006 level of 2.5 bcm (total imports in 2006 were 
2.3 bcm, of which around 0.9 bcm were used by the breakaway region of 
Transnistria, with the result that only around 1.4 bcm were used by Moldova 
proper). The transit tariff for Russian gas exports via Moldova remains unchanged. 
Moldova transits on average 20 to 22 bcm of Russian gas annually to Balkan 
countries (mainly to the EU member state of Romania). Mirroring the situation in 
Belarus, this five-year agreement with Gazprom also stipulates a gradual increase 
in the price to a European ‘average price’ minus transportation costs. Under this 
agreement, Gazprom will charge Moldova 75% of that price in 2008, 85% in 2009, 
90% in 2010, and 100% in 2011. As part of the agreement, Moldova transferred the 
ownership of its domestic gas distribution networks to Gazprom, as a way to 
reduce further the remaining accumulated arrears. 
Ukraine 
In December 2005/January 2006, a very heated dispute arose between Russia and 
Ukraine concerning a request by Gazprom to increase the gas price charged to 
Ukraine, from $50 per tcm to $230 in January 2006. Ukraine is the major transit 
country for Russian gas to its EU markets and is responsible for about 80% of total 
deliveries. (Ukraine transited about 115 bcm of gas until 2005 and received about 
25-bcm worth of gas as a barter payment for that transit. The transit fee paid to 
Ukraine was $1.09 per tcm/100 km; by comparison, the EU transit fee was $2.6 per 
tcm/100 km in 2005.) Ukraine rejected Gazprom’s offer, leading to the suspension 
of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine on 1 January 2006.  
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Box 2.7, cont. 
This suspension briefly affected some EU markets, as Ukraine sought to 
compensate for the reduction in Russian deliveries by siphoning off gas destined 
for the EU. An agreement was reached on 4 January 2006. Valid for five years, the 
agreement set prices at an average of $95 (for a combined aggregate of Russian and 
Turkmen gas) for 2006. Ukrainian transit fees were also increased by 47%, to $1.6 
per tcm/100 km. All gas is now traded on a cash basis and all gas imports into 
Ukraine are now undertaken through a monopoly, RosUkrEnergo (a non-
transparent company with headquarters in Switzerland). In late 2006, prices were 
raised again, to $130 per tcm. So far, Ukraine has resisted Gazprom’s proposals for 
the transfer of ownership of its pipeline network. 
In summary, despite of such significant energy price increases for countries 
largely dependent on Russian gas, the predicted negative growth effects have so 
far not materialised, largely owing to the accumulation of private and quasi-
private external debt, plus other nationally specific factors (Lysenko & Vinhas de 
Souza, 2007). 
––––––––––––––––––––––– 
† Not only did Belarus receive natural gas from Russia at well below the Western European 
rates, it also benefited from very specific arrangements in the oil trade (Lysenko & Vinhas de 
Souza, 2007). Belarus imported crude oil from Russia free of export duties, and exported 
refined oil products primarily to Western Europe at a large mark-up. According to the terms 
of a 1995 treaty, Belarus and Russia were supposed to unify export duties on oil and refined 
oil products and to share Belarusian export-duty revenues: 15% to Belarus and 85% to 
Russia. But Belarus charged lower export duties on exports of oil and refined oil products, 
violating the agreement. Moreover, Belarus did not transfer the corresponding revenue to 
the Russian budget, in spite of several complaints by the Russian government over the 
years: in 2005–06, the foregone revenue for Russia was estimated at over $1 billion per year. 
This situation generated substantial profits for some Russian companies that had transferred 
their refining operations to Belarus, and boosted Belarusian exports and fiscal revenues. In 
December 2006, shortly before the rise in gas prices, this offshore tax avoidance scheme with 
oil duties was ended by Russia. Tensions between the countries escalated in January 2007, 
and the standoff was only resolved on 12 January 2007. Later, in December 2007 Russia 
provided Belarus with a loan of $1.5 billion, to cushion the adjustment costs. 
Source: Based on Lysenko & Vinhas de Souza (2007). 
 
Beyond that, Gazprom has started a flurry of moves aimed at 
increasing its market presence in the EU, through acquisitions, bilateral 
deals, infrastructure construction and asset swaps with companies in 
several EU countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, 
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Portugal and the UK) (see Table 2.5). The company is also engaged in 
several deals, some of them rather muscular (see Box 2.8), towards the 
expansion of its production and transport capabilities within and outside 
Russia.90 These deals are mainly focused on the Asian markets – especially 
China – as the overwhelming share of Gazprom’s transport infrastructure 
is geared towards the EU market, which currently puts the EU in a near-
monopsony position with respect to Gazprom. 
Table 2.5 Gazprom’s foreign subsidiaries and affiliates 
Country Company name Types of operations Gazprom’s 
share (%) 
Armenia Armrosgazprom Gas distribution 45 
Austria Gas und Warenhandelsgesellschaft Sale of gas 50 
Belarus BelTransGaz Gas distribution 50 
Bulgaria Overgaz Gas distribution 23 
  Overgaz Incorporated Investing 50 
  Topenergo Gas distribution 100 
Cyprus Leadville Investments Ltd Investing 100 
Czech Rep. Gas Invest Investing n.d. 
Estonia Eesti Gaas Gas distribution 37 
Finland Gasum Gas distribution 25 
  North Transgas OY Gas transportation 50 
France Fragaz Gas trading 50 
Germany Wingas Gas distribution 35 
  WIEH Gas distribution 50 
  ZMB Gas distribution 100 
  GWH Gas distribution 100 
  ZGG Gas distribution 100 
                                                 
90 As an example of the expansion strategy within Russia, in October 2006 the 
Russian government awarded Gazprom a monopoly on the exploration of the 
giant Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea, without the participation of the 
foreign partners (Statoil, Hydro, Conoco, Chevron and Total) that had been 
planning to bid for allocations in the field. Gazprom later announced that it could 
invite selected foreign firms as its subcontractors there (indeed, in July 2007 
Gazprom allocated 24% of the Shtokman field to Total, and a similar share later in 
the year to Norsk Hydro). Another example is the selling of the TNK-BP share of 
the Kovytka oil and gas field to Gazprom in June 2007, a sale caused by TNK-BP’s 
fears of losing the exploration licence for the field (admittedly for not complying 
with the terms of the licence). 
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Table 2.5, cont. 
Greece Prometheus Gas Foreign trade 50 
Hungary Panrusgaz Sale of gas 40 
  Borsodchem Petrochemical production 25 
  DKG-EAST Co. Inc. Gas trading 38 
  TVK n.d. 14 
  General Banking and Trust Investing 26 
Italy Promgaz Gas distribution 50 
  VOLT A S.p.a Gas trading 49 
Kazakhstan KazRosGaz Gas distribution 50 
Latvia Latvijas Gaze Gas distribution 34 
Lithuania Lietuvos Dujos Gas distribution 34 
  Stella Vitae Gas distribution 50 
  Kaunasskaya power station Electricity 99 
Moldova Moldovagaz Gas distribution 50 
Netherlands Gazprom Finance B.V. Investing 100 
  Blue Stream Pipeline Co. Construction, gas transport 50 
  West–East Pipeline Project 
Investment 
Construction, investing 100 
Poland EuRoPolGAZ Gas distribution 48 
  Gas Trading Sale of gas 16 
Romania Wirom Gas distribution 25 
  WIEE Gas distribution 50 
Serbia Progresgaz Trading Ltd Gas distribution 25 
 NIS Gas distribution 51 
Slovakia Slovrusgas Gas trading 50 
  Slovensky Plynaremky 
Priemysel 
Gas distribution 16 
Slovenia Tagdem  – n.d. 
Turkey Turusgaz Sale of gas 45 
UK Gazprom Marketing and 
Trading Ltd 
Gas distribution 100 
  Gazprom UK Ltd Investing, banking 100 
  Interconnector (UK) Ltd Gas trading 10 
  HydroWingas Gas distribution 50 
Note: n.d. refers to not disclosed.  
Source: UNCTAD. 
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Box 2.8 Gazprom and Sakhalin II 
The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources made a decision on 18 September 
2006 to revoke the overall environmental permit for the Sakhalin II project, 
effectively threatening to shut down an investment worth tens of billions of US 
dollars. Sakhalin II is a very large venture undertaking gas exploration, 
transport, liquefied natural gas (the only such facility for the latter in Russia) 
and shipping situated in the Russian Pacific coast, designed to cater mainly for 
the Asian market. Sakhalin II is also covered by one of only three energy-sector 
Production Sharing Agreements that were signed during the 1990s.† The 
apparent reasons for the action were i) a cost overrun of $10 billion by the Shell-
led project, which would have effectively denied the Russian government 
several billions of dollars in revenues, under the PSA terms; and ii) an overall 
perception of the PSAs as too advantageous for foreign investors. 
The situation was resolved on 21 December 2006: Gazprom bought 50% 
plus one share of the project from the consortium partners, Royal Dutch Shell, 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi Corporation, for a reported $7.5 billion. The 
environmental suit was quietly dropped after that. 
––––––––––––––––––––––– 
† PSAs are contracts that replace the existing tax and licence regimes with ad hoc 
arrangements that exist for the life of the project. PSAs were created in Russia in 
December 1993 by presidential decree, but the PSA Law was not enacted until 1995. Just 
three PSAs were ever signed: 
• Sakhalin I, an oil and gas development on the northeast shelf of Sakhalin island, 
begun in late 2001. The consortium members are ExxonMobil (with 30%), the 
Japanese consortium SODECO (30%), Rosneft (20%) and the Indian state-owned oil 
company ONGC Videsh Ltd., with the remaining (20%); 
• Sakhalin II (the first PSA signed, in 1996); and  
• the sub-arctic oil field of Kharyaga, where Total holds a 50% stake and the 
Norwegian oil and gas company Norsk Hydro holds another 40%, while the state-
owned Nenets Oil Company holds the remaining 10%. The Russian government 
has had the legal option of increasing its capital by 20% (10% from Total and 10% 
from Norsk Hydro) since 2007. 
 
Beyond the financing needs for the deals outlined in the previous 
paragraph, the investment and depreciation needed for the continued 
development of the Russian gas sector are immense. The government’s 
Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 
forecasts the need for investments in the order of $660–880 billion until 
2020 (or $30–40 billion per year). To put these numbers in perspective, the 
combined capital expenditures of the largest companies in the sector 
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(Lukoil, Rosneft, TNK-BP, Surgutneftegaz, Gazprom Neft, Tatneft, 
Gazprom and NOVATEK) totalled $20.5 billion in 2005, and an estimated 
$21.5 billion in 2006.91 
These very significant financing needs and the clear interest of 
Gazprom in entering the EU market may provide leverage for pressing for 
domestic liberalisation, if the EU manages to act fast and in a consistent 
fashion. In any case, domestic liberalisation should be pursued because it is 
welfare-improving for Russia itself. 
The reform of the FDI framework is linked to another subject 
concerning Russia: the competitiveness of its economy. This topic is dealt 
with in the next section. 
2.5 Competitiveness 
Some studies indicate that resource-rich countries may grow at a slower 
pace than non-resource rich ones, in what is termed in the literature as the 
‘natural resource curse’.92 Although such growth underperformance does 
not seem to be the case for Russia,93 this issue is still worthy of policy-
makers’ attention. 
Three main (non-exclusive) explanations are offered for the natural 
resource curse (Oomes & Kalcheva, 2007). The first is that natural resource 
wealth gives rise to rent-seeking behaviour, the second is that natural 
                                                 
91 The combined capital expenditures of this group of companies increased quite 
significantly between 2004 and 2005, by almost 48% in nominal US dollar terms 
and by a further 4.6% in 2006. The state-owned companies (Gazprom and Rosneft) 
were responsible for almost 80% of this increase. 
92 Some studies do find that a high level of resource abundance leads to lower 
growth rates (see Sachs & Warner, 1995 – the literature classic – and Manzano & 
Rigobon, 2001). On the other hand, some papers question this finding and argue 
that, after correcting for institutions, no negative effects of primarily resources-led 
growth exist (see Gylfason et al., 1997; Gylfason, 2000; Matsen & Torvik, 2005; 
Arezki & van der Ploeg, 2007). 
93 As indicated previously, since 1999, Russia’s growth performance has been quite 
close to the CIS and ‘all transition’ averages, and has comfortably surpassed the 
performance of the new EU member states, not to mention the EU average (see 
Figure 1.4 in section 1.4.1). Russia also performs far above a sample of resource-
rich countries, as shown in Figure 1.14 in section 1.5.3. 
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resource dependence implies terms-of-trade volatility, while the third (and 
most common) is the Dutch disease.  
According to the first explanation, resource wealth may generate a 
conflict over the existing resources, which leads to poor institutional 
quality and lower growth (in other words, the substantial rents that can be 
derived from the natural resources create incentives for governments and 
private agents to engage in unproductive rent-seeking behaviour, crowding 
out other activities). The second explanation is based on the empirical 
observation that natural resource prices tend to be volatile, and volatility is 
negatively correlated with growth and investment. Finally, the Dutch 
disease hypothesis is the notion that an exogenous increase in resource 
prices or output94 results in a real exchange rate appreciation and 
ultimately a decline in the domestic manufacturing sector, while the 
services sector will expand (as manufactured goods are mostly tradable, 
while services are not, the price of manufactured goods are set on the 
world markets).95 
The Dutch disease hypothesis also generates three testable 
implications (Oomes & Kalcheva, 2007): i) there is a fall in manufacturing 
output and employment, ii) real wages increase and iii) the real exchange 
rate appreciates (as the prices for services rise). How well these three 
features apply to Russia is considered below. 
1) The share of manufacturing output and employment. When considering 
these aspects for Russia, two provisos must be taken into 
consideration. First, centrally planned economies tend to have a 
higher share of industry in GDP than countries with comparable GDP 
per capita levels; therefore, the transition process is also a process of 
relative de-industrialisation. Second, as countries grow richer, the 
consumption basket (and hence production) switches to services, 
which grow in terms of GDP share. Thus, a catching-up process also 
implies a relative de-industrialisation. 
With these provisos in mind, Table 2.6 shows that the share of 
manufacturing industry in GDP has remained roughly constant in 
                                                 
94 In the original Dutch case that gave the disease its name, the increase stemmed 
from the discovery of large natural gas deposits off the coast of the Netherlands. 
95 The Dutch disease notion can be linked not only to any natural resource 
(including agricultural crops) but also to any increase in foreign exchange inflows, 
including international transfers (like EU funds and remittances), aid or loans. 
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Russia since 1999. Meanwhile, the industrial employment share in 
total employment has fallen marginally, by roughly 1%. 
Table 2.6 Shares of industry and services in GDP and employment for Russia (%) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Avg. 
Share of 
manufacturing 
industry in 
GDP 
18.1 19 17.6 17.9 17.6 17.0 18.1 19.3 19.4 18.1 
Share of services 
in GDP 
64.4 61.5 55 56.7 59.5 59.7 59 60 58.2 59.3 
Share of 
industrial 
employment 
20.7 22.4 22.7 22.7 22.2 21.8 21.4 21.7 21.2 21.9 
Labour 
productivity in 
industry 
0.8 7.3 10.1 5 6.8 10.5 8.9 6.2 5.8 6.8 
Real wage 
increase 
73.8 10.9 22.4 27.1 19.5 12.8 12.3 14.4 14.6 6.7 
Sources: EBRD, Rosstat and author’s own calculations. 
 
In other words, it is not clear that Russia has experienced either 
a loss in the share of its manufacturing industry in GDP or a 
reduction of industrial employment in total employment, at least 
since 1999, so Russia does not seem to reflect this Dutch disease 
symptom. 
2) Wage increases. Wages have indeed increased in Russia, but so far, this 
tendency has been outstripped by productivity increases. The average 
real wage increase during the 1998–2006 period was 6.7% per year, 
while the average yearly rise in labour productivity in industry for 
the same period was 6.8% (although the average productivity figures 
for this period are clearly bolstered by the 1998 devaluation). Figure 
2.6, which shows the relative productivity of Russian industry against 
a composite benchmark of the EU and the US, reveals that Russian 
productivity has systematically grown compared with this 
benchmark, especially since its departure from the peg regime in 
1998. Thus, the loss in competitiveness that one could expect from the 
Dutch disease is not observed in the data available (Oomes & 
Kalcheva, 2007). 
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Figure 2.6 Relative Russian productivity (100: 1995-01) 
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Sources: Author’s estimations based on data kindly provided by Oomes & Kalcheva. 
 
3) REER. The real exchange rate has appreciated in Russia and is now 
above its pre-1998 level (see Figure 1.6 in section 1.4.3). One of the 
reasons for that is the higher inflation rate in Russia than in its 
trading partners and the substantial current account surpluses 
stemming from the commodities boom, which is consistent with the 
Dutch disease hypothesis. Nevertheless, another reason for the REER 
appreciation is that Russian productivity has grown faster than that 
of its partners (see again Figure 2.6). This is a common phenomenon 
in transition economies and those that are catching up, and is usually 
referred to as the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Oomes & Kalcheva, 
2007). According to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, the real 
exchange rate should appreciate in line with the relative productivity 
differentials as an equilibrium process. If productivity growth in the 
tradables sector exceeds productivity growth in the non-tradables 
sector, the prices of Russian non-tradables will rise over time, while 
the prices of Russian tradables will not (as the latter are determined 
by the world level). This implies a rise in the overall Russian price 
level, i.e. a real appreciation. Put differently, at least some of the 
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REER development in Russia is a necessary (and again, beneficial) 
equilibrium reaction to a catching-up process.96 
The conclusion of this section is that a clear majority of analyses find 
it difficult to detect any clear symptoms of the Dutch disease in Russia,97 
although of course, given the potential negative effects of the Dutch 
disease, care should be taken to prevent it from developing. In any case, the 
issue of competitiveness is closely linked to the overall reform of the state 
apparatus as the latter affects incentives and defines the framework for 
investment, both domestic and foreign. This area of reform is briefly 
discussed in the next section. 
2.6 Taming the leviathan: The reform of the Russian state 
The reform of Russian state institutions is arguably the most important 
item on the country’s reform agenda, especially in an environment of a 
seemingly activist state that seeks to create state-owned or backed ‘national 
champions’ (even if some policy statements may present this as a 
temporary stage for a future re-privatisation).  
The reforms undertaken in the early 2000s by the Putin 
administration reorganised relations between the federal centre and the 
regions, and re-ordered the structure of the federal government itself. Since 
then, most of the recent efforts have been focused on reforming the courts, 
the civil service (through the Presidential Decree on Administrative Reform 
of July 2003) and the major regulatory institutions, and on their relations 
with the federal and regional governments (with both sets of reforms 
interrelated). Perhaps inevitably, progress in the implementation of these 
                                                 
96 On the other hand, Habib & Kalamova (2007) find that there is a long-term 
relationship between the ruble real exchange rate and oil prices, although they 
caution that the shortness of the time series affects the interpretation of this result. 
97 An exception to this is the recent work by Ollus & Barisitz (2007). The authors, 
using a 2000–06 sample and working with EU–Russia imports (the EU supplies 
over 50% of Russia’s total imports), claim to find signs of the Dutch disease, 
represented by a stronger growth of Russian imports from the EU than domestic 
production in some Russian industrial sectors. It should be noted that to assume 
this as a sign of Dutch disease implies a conclusion about the nature of imports, 
namely, whether they are complements to or substitutes for domestic production. As 
most Russian imports from the EU are of capital goods, they could be seen as 
complements to domestic production, and therefore necessary for the 
modernisation of Russian industry. 
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reforms has been uneven. While taxation and regulatory capabilities have 
indeed improved substantially (for the fiscal framework, see section 2.2 
above), the same cannot be said for rule enforcement or other areas (OECD, 
2006b and 2004) (see also Box 2.9). 
 
Box 2.9 Some recent reforms in the Russian legal framework 
• Amendments clarifying the law on competition were passed in September 
2002.  
• Concerning intellectual property rights, at present Russian legislation mostly 
matches international standards, after the corresponding section of the 
Civil Code was signed into law in December 2006. 
• In September 2002, in collaboration with and supported by the World 
Bank, the European Commission (through the TACIS programme), the 
EBRD and the OECD, the Russian government changed the legislation on 
corporate governance.  
• A new bankruptcy law was passed in the autumn of 2002, changing and 
clarifying the relations between creditors and debtors. It also toughened 
penalties for deliberate misinformation and false bankruptcy.  
• Two laws against money laundering were passed in July 2001 and September 
2002. 
The main question concerning the significant legal changes above is their 
enforcement, which refers to the reform of the state apparatus discussed in this 
section. 
Source: OECD (2006b and 2004). 
 
Serious questions remain concerning the independence of the judicial 
and law enforcement systems and the state, as state bodies are sometimes 
‘captured’ by private or sectoral interests. The Russian state bureaucracy is 
naturally multilayered (reflecting the size and complexity of the country) 
and often unresponsive to the needs of the population. At the least, it is 
viewed as being non-transparent, pervaded by corruption and beholden to 
interest groups (as plainly illustrated by the recent episode involving the 
Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, Gazprom, Shell and the Sakhalin II 
project previously described in Box 2.8). 
An extensive reform of the Russian judicial system was undertaken in 
2001 (Owen & Robinson, 2003). It included a new civil code and a new code 
for the arbitration courts, and new laws on the status of judges and on the 
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constitutional court. A further step taken in the same year was the 
reduction and clarification of the role of the federal prosecutor’s office. 
Even so, these efforts have not affected the overall perception of the 
unreliability of the Russian legal system, and some well-known cases seem 
to substantiate this impression (for instance, the recent jailing of a deputy 
minister of finance for corruption under rather unclear circumstances). 98 In 
any case, formal judicial independence has been strengthened by the new 
law on the status of judges, which raises judicial pay and establishes new 
mechanisms for punishing judicial malpractice. The federal government 
has also sought to improve the financing and training99 of the judicial 
system, and has tried to reduce the dependence of judges on regional 
authorities (but tellingly, not to curtail the federal influence on them). In 
addition, a new tier of arbitration courts has been created (OECD, 2004).  
In the end, there is a limited amount of external influence that can 
affect the reform of Russian state institutions. The feasible policy 
recommendation would be the continued support of the reformist 
institutions within the Russian government – the Ministry of 
Finance/MEDT, the CBR and the Federal Service for Financial Markets. 
Further recommendations are to engage consistently with other bodies of 
the wider Russian state structure at the federal and regional levels, and to 
use the international fora that enable the sharing of international best 
practice with the Russian government. 
The full utilisation of these external anchors for reform is an 
important part of this strategy. Among these anchors are G8 participation, 
WTO accession,100 OECD membership,101 the future EU–Russia framework 
agreement that will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
                                                 
98 Even the newly elected Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, called Russia a 
“country of legal nihilism” in a speech in January 2008.  
99 It was not until 1999 that the Russian Academy of Justice was founded, a body 
that provides training for judges in the Supreme and Arbitration Courts. It almost 
doubled its intake of trainees in 2005 to around 9,000 with the support of an EU 
TACIS programme (EBRD, 2007). 
100  Russia signed an agreement with the EU concerning its WTO Accession already 
in 2004. 
101 Russia was accepted for eventual OECD membership in May 2007. The 
European Commission is also a party of the OECD Convention, its founding 
charter, and therefore represented in this organisation. 
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(PCA),102 an eventual EU–Russia deep free trade agreement after WTO 
accession, the EU–Russia Sectoral Dialogues initiated under the 2003 EU–
Russia ‘common spaces’103 (including the EU–Russia Macroeconomic and 
Financial Issues Dialogue),104 the EIB and the EBRD,105 and of course, the 
                                                 
102 The PCA has been the framework of the EU–Russia relationship for a decade. It 
was signed in 1994 and entered into force on 1 December 1997 for an initial period 
of 10 years; it was automatically extended for one year in 2007. The agreement 
regulates the political, economic and cultural relations between the EU and Russia 
and is therefore the legal basis for the EU’s bilateral trade and investment with 
Russia. One of its main objectives is to promote trade and investment as well as the 
development of harmonious and sustainable economic relations between the 
parties. The PCA contains several special provisions regarding economic relations 
between the EU and Russia. Pending approval of a negotiating mandate by the 
European Council, it is expected in due course to be replaced by a framework 
agreement. 
103 At the St Petersburg summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce 
cooperation with a view to creating four EU–Russian common spaces in the 
context of the existing PCA. The common economic space aims at increasing 
opportunities for economic operators, a further step towards establishing a more 
open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. The three other spaces are 
the common space of freedom, security and justice; the common space on external 
security; and the common space on research, education and culture. They are 
complemented by the roadmap on the common economic space, adopted at the 
EU–Russia summit in Moscow on 10 May 2005. This document sets out a number 
of principles and priority activities. It also sets up various dialogues on specific 
issues, including economic and finance-related issues. 
104 This framework is the main channel between Russia and the European 
Commission for the discussion of macroeconomic and financial subjects, involving 
the Directorate-Generals for ECFIN and the Internal Market and Services, which is 
managed by this author at ECFIN. The 2007 meeting of this framework took place 
during October 2007 in Brussels. The next meeting is scheduled to take place in 
Russia during the fall of 2008. 
105 With respect to the EBRD, the anchor is effected through conditionalities in their 
projects. Under a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the EIB’s so-called 
‘third external mandate’, which covers the resources made available to it for 
investment in the Western CIS countries, the EIB and the EBRD shall act jointly in 
project preparation and acquisition in the areas traditionally covered by the EIB 
(such as infrastructure). One must note here that both the European Commission 
and the EIB have shares of EBRD’s capital, and therefore seats on its board. In 
addition, EU member states, plus the European Commission and the EIB, have 
over 64% of EBRD’s capital. 
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traditional Bretton Woods institutions.106 The several EU–Russia Sectoral 
Dialogues, given their capacity and institutional mandate to interact 
comprehensively with multiple bodies of the Russian government, are 
perhaps uniquely qualified for such a deep sharing of best practice with 
Russian counterparts. 
Nonetheless, the continued reform of the state must be pursued 
because it is in Russia’s own interest. The lack of continued reform there is 
not only problematic in itself, it also calls into question the effectiveness of 
reform in all other areas, including the macroeconomic framework and 
financial sector in which Russia is recognised to have been relatively 
successful. 
Finally, it should be recognised that any reforms inevitably have 
social costs, which are discussed in the next section. 
2.7 Inequality and social reform 
Transition had some initially wrenching social consequences in Russia. 
Open unemployment, almost unheard of during Communist times (albeit 
underemployment was substantial) jumped with the onset of the 
transformation period, from 0.08% in 1991 (effectively, full employment) to 
5.3% in the following year, representing a 6,400% increase (and by 1998, it 
had more than doubled, to 13.3%). Poverty grew very significantly: using a 
World Bank usual poverty indicator (namely, the share of the population 
with a PPP-adjusted income of less than $2 a day), poverty in Russia rose 
from 2% in 1988 (admittedly a very low figure, which, like many USSR 
statistics, may have been distorted) to 23% in 1994 (or a rise of over 
1,000%). By 1998, it would reach over 36%.107 Income inequality also 
escalated, as measured by a Gini index, from 0.26 in 1991 to 0.41 in 1994. 
The fall in living standards was accompanied by a rise in the mortality rate 
of nearly 50% (which increased from 10.7 per 1,000 persons in 1988 to 15.7 
in 1994). These trends were accompanied by diminishing life expectancy 
                                                 
106 The European Commission broadly coordinates its actions in the CIS/Balkans 
regions with those of the World Bank, through a Memorandum of Understanding. 
107 An emblematic and haunting image of those days is the picture of pensioners 
being paid in kind (commonly in bread, which they would themselves have to sell 
in open stalls to acquire money). At that time, the state was unable to pay their 
pensions in cash (as the state itself was being paid in kind by taxpayers, in a chain 
of barter transactions). 
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(from 69.5 years in 1989 to 64.3 in 1994), with a consequent population 
reduction (from 148.3 million in 1990 to under 143 million in 2006).  
The years of accumulated strong growth altered this picture greatly. 
By December 2007, unemployment in Russia had fallen to 6% (ILO 
methodology), halving its post-1998 level (see Figure 2.7). As a consequence 
of the prolonged economic boom, some regions of Russia effectively face 
labour shortages.  
Figure 2.7 Unemployment and poverty 
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Sources: Rosstat and WDI. 
 
Also, following the CIS-wide trend of strong reductions in poverty 
and in income inequalities, the poverty rate in Russia fell from 36% in the 
aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis to 17% in 2004, with almost 20 million 
Russians being lifted out of poverty in the space of a few years. The share 
of households whose income was less than $2 a day had fallen to around 
4% in 2004. There has been a small reduction in inequality, with the Gini 
index falling from its post-1998 high of 0.37 to 0.34 in 2002,108 although it is 
                                                 
108 As a comparator, the Gini index for Brazil, China and South Africa were 
respectively, 0.58 (2003), 0.45 (2001) and 0.58 (2000). Germany scored 0.28 (2000) in 
this index. 
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not clear if this reduction trend continued afterwards. A retrenchment in 
social expenditures is also being reversed. This is partially being done 
through the National Priority Projects for health, education, housing and 
agriculture, which are expected to add 0.8% of GDP in expenditures in 
those areas during 2007. 
On the other hand, the Russian official population continues to age 
and shrink,109 although life expectancy seems to have started to increase 
again, reaching 65.8 years in 2005, as has fertility. Mortality rates are still 
very high in Russia, particularly among working-age men. The rate of 
population increase in Russia is the world’s second lowest: -0.6%, just 
above Ukraine’s -0.8%. The UN forecasts a population decline in Russia 
during the period 2004–50 of 22% (from 144 to 112 million). In order to 
compensate this decline in full, an annual inflow of around 1 million 
working-age migrants would be necessary. As there is no visa regime 
among the CIS countries (with the exception of Georgia), formal 
immigration flows have indeed been quite substantial, especially in the last 
few years. More specifically, the Russian Federal Migration Service issued 
650,000 work permits to foreigners in 2005 alone, and it estimates that there 
may be up to 14 million – legal and illegal – foreign workers in the country (or 
around 10% of the entire Russian population). According to census data, 
until 2002 most of the decline in the Russian population (5%) was 
compensated by a net migration of 3.8%. Given the very large volume of 
unregistered migration, it may even have fully compensated the population 
fall.  
This large number of foreign workers is relatively recent, 
corresponding to the later stages of Russia’s resumption of growth. With 
the aim of addressing this large and mostly unregulated migrant 
population, and after several ethnic and xenophobic incidents during 2006, 
Russia introduced a new migration law in late 2006. Under it, a quota of 6 
million foreign workers was set for 2007. The new legislation also relaxes 
the rather stringent procedures for CIS and other foreign citizens to obtain 
legal work permits. At the same time, it increases fines for businesses that 
                                                 
109 Russia’s official resident population fell to 142.2 million in 2007, from 143.5 
million in 2005. 
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employ illegal migrants. Additionally, a government decree restricts the 
number of non-Russians working in the retail trade.110 
The strong increase Russia experienced in social inequality and 
exclusion in its post-transition period has been significantly reversed by the 
post-1998 growth. Still, as in so many domains, continued reform is 
necessary, especially in areas such as pensions (see Gurvich, 2007), health 
care and the regulation of migration. 
                                                 
110 In late 2007, in the wake of the EU–Russia visa facilitation agreement, a reform 
of the visa procedures was introduced. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS: A DIFFERENT COUNTRY 
his study has described the substantial changes observed in Russia 
since the end of the USSR. It has charted the wrenching initial period 
of massive economic and social dislocation following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the introduction of market economy institutions, to 
the apparent stabilisation of the mid-1990s and the subsequent crisis of 
1998. It has also traced the resumption of growth, sustained from 1999 
onwards, generated by the accumulated effects of economic and structural 
reforms and high energy prices. After the momentous changes of the past 
15 years, synthetically captured by the data in Table 3.1, Russia can now 
truly be called a different country. The limited effects suffered so far by 
Russia from the wave of financial instability that began in August 2007 – a 
far cry from the 1998 crisis (while recognising the remaining structural 
fragilities of the Russian banking system) – also demonstrate how much the 
country has changed. 
The discussion has shown that Russia’s macro performance does not 
underperform that of other genuinely similar countries, either before or 
after 1998. The length and intensity of its transitional recession during the 
early to mid-1990s was related to the later start of reforms in the CIS 
countries, the depth of distortions accumulated by the three generations of 
a centrally planned economy and the lack of a binding external anchor, 
such as the EU accession process. The situation of the USSR was further 
aggravated by a national break-up. It is therefore incorrect to compare 
Russia’s performance with the new EU member states: there are some 
similarities, but the differences are much more profound.  
 
 
T 
A DIFFERENT COUNTRY: RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC RESURGENCE | 95 
 
Table 3.1 Russia, before and after 1998 
  1989–98 
average 
1999-2007 
Average 
2007 
GDP (nominal $ billion) 221 579 1348 
Growth (%) -6.3 7.0 8.1 
Inflation (%) 570 22.3 11.9 
Budget balance (% GDP) -10.5 3.3 5.6 
Current account balance (% GDP) 1.6 10.3 6 
Unemployment (%) 9.1 8.6 6.1 
Sources: IMF and Rosstat. 
 
The 1998 crisis was part of a string of similar crises throughout the 
1990s, linked to the underlying unsustainability of a hard(er) exchange rate 
regime without a consistent policy mix in an environment of liberalised 
capital flows (admittedly coupled with some microeconomic 
vulnerabilities). The 1992–93 travails of the first exchange rate mechanism 
in the EU, the 1994 Mexican collapse, the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1999 
Brazilian one and the 2001 Argentinian experience all generally fall into this 
category. Russia’s post-1999 performance is rather impressive, especially 
when compared with similar economies (both commodity-exporting and 
non-commodity exporting ones), in terms of both GDP and inflation.  
Even in terms of structural reform, when benchmarked against 
broadly similar economies (either other CIS countries or the other emerging 
giants of the BRICS), Russia’s performance is respectable. All the 
fundamental structures of a market economy have been established – 
frequently at considerable social and economic cost – and the 
macroeconomic framework is clearly much more robust than it was in the 
mid-1990s. Additionally, despite the perception conveyed by some 
analyses, structural reform – albeit slower in certain areas – has not 
stopped.  
That is not to say that a substantial, unfinished reform agenda does 
not remain: it does, and it includes some macro components, but mostly 
microeconomic and structural ones.  
In terms of the macro challenges, how to cope with the reduction and 
eventual disappearance of the current account surplus is likely to be the most 
important matter for medium-term policy. This change will imply a need for 
continued positive net capital inflows, and the only way to assure that is to 
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create a reliable investment climate, itself a structural reform challenge. More 
investment and thus a better investment climate will equally be necessary 
for that perennial Russian problem, the need to diversify the economy 
away from the commodities sector. 
These issues are linked to the reform of the Russian state institutions and 
policies. Here the credible available instrument is primarily the continued 
support for the reformist institutions within the Russian government but 
also for the wider apparatus of the Russian state and for the international 
fora that enable the sharing of international best practice with the Russian 
government. The full use of external anchors for reform, including the  G8, 
WTO accession, OECD membership, the future EU–Russia framework 
agreement, the EU–Russia deep free trade agreement and the EU–Russia 
Sectoral Dialogues, is a feasible, necessary and important part of this 
strategy. 
In the area of most immediate strategic relevance for the EU, the 
energy industry, continued reforms and the opening-up of the sector are 
necessary, especially now in an environment of rapidly increasing capital 
inflows into Russia. Reform in this area is thus tightly bound with the 
reform of FDI legislation in Russia. Negative developments, such as the 
continued domestic and external expansion of large state-owned 
enterprises in the energy sector, and the persistent uncertainty faced by 
foreign investors concerning the legal framework for FDI, are only partially 
mitigated by some positive steps, the most recent being the December 2006 
timetable for the liberalisation of domestic energy prices. Given the strong 
interest of some of those state-owned enterprises in expanding their 
presence in EU markets, there may be a window of opportunity to achieve 
a greater liberalisation of the energy sector in Russia – a liberalisation that 
is primarily positive for Russia itself – for access to the unified EU energy 
market, but this can only be achieved if the EU acts in a consistent and 
effective way. 
Nevertheless, in the end only the Russians themselves will be able to 
assure the consistent implementation of reforms. And this will only occur if 
a clear, coherent and convincing case is made demonstrating that such 
reforms will ultimately be beneficial, and mostly so for Russia and its 
population. 
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